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ABSTRACT 
Four Days that Transformed Spain: 11-M Impact on 
Memory Recovery Examined through the Lens of Duality 
Thomas J. Divins 
This thesis studies the controversial aftermath of the Madrid terrorist attack of 
March 11, 2004 and how it impacted the history of memory and silence in Spain since the 
Spanish Civil War.  The terrorist attack had surprising and significant short-term political 
impacts, which have been well documented by historians, political scientists, and 
journalists.  However, surveying the attack aftermath through the lens of the history of 
duality in Spain has been less studied.  The “lens of duality” is the viewpoint that Spain’s 
history in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can be explained as a clash between 
deeply-divided sectors within society which created a sense of duality.  This duality has 
been exhibited not only in society, but also in politics, and came to the forefront of 
conversation following the Madrid train bombings.  The thesis offers a new perspective 
from the viewpoint of the history of memory and silence regarding the controversies 
following the terrorist attack and its effect on society in Spain. 
 
 This thesis is divided into four parts: 1) introduction and duality of Spain; 2) 
controversies following the Madrid terrorist attack; 3) impact on Spanish historical 
memory, silence, and society, and 4) conclusion and recommendations. 
 
 One of the purposes of this thesis is to demonstrate that the Madrid terrorist attack 
and its aftermath intensified the recovery of Spanish Civil War memories and the breaking 
of post-Civil War silence in Spain.  Another purpose is to present a theory for the 
surprising response of the Spanish people to the 11-M crisis. 
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Four Days that Transformed Spain: 11-M Impact on Memory Recovery Examined through 
the Lens of Duality 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ya hay un español que quiere 
vivir y a vivir empieza, 
entre una España que muere 
y otra España que bosteza. 
Españolito que vienes 
al mundo, te guarde Dios: 
Una de las dos Españas 
ha de helarte el corazón. 
 
There is now a Spaniard who wants 
to live, and is beginning to live, 
between a Spain that dies 
and a Spain that yawns. 
Little Spaniard who comes into 
this world, God help you! 
One of the two Spains 
will freeze your heart. 
 
Antonio Machado, Untitled poem, but widely known as The Two Spains, 1913
1
 
Historical Background of Spanish Duality 
The concept of “two Spains” has been a persistent theme in Spanish identity since at least 
1836 when Mariano José de Larra wrote an article about a divided Spain, titled “El día de 
                                                 
1
 Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, and Joan Botella, Democracy in Modern Spain (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 64. 
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Difuntos de 1836” (All Soul’s Day 1836).2  Just before the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Spanish-American War destroyed Spanish colonialism and dreams of empire with far-
reaching political and societal impact.  Subsequently, a debate arose between conservatives and 
liberals to create a vision and common destiny for Spain.  Conservatives believed that there was 
a need to regenerate Spain along traditional values and ‘hispanicity’ based on the Catholic 
monarchy and the Reconquista.  In contrast, liberals blamed the Catholic Church, the monarchy, 
and landowners for repressing Spain and for failing to modernize, hence the defeat to the modern 
United States Navy.  They were in essence arguing that Spain had many remnants of feudal 
society.  The debate failed to create a consensus vision and destiny, which reinforced a divided 
Spain, and also failed to construct a coherent frame of nationalism, which aided in the 
development of regional nationalism.   
When Machado wrote his poem in 1913, his “two Spains” were that one was Catholic 
and reactionary and that the other was secular and progressive.  Then between the founding of 
the Second Republic in 1931 and the start of the Civil War in 1936, several changes of 
alternating conservative and liberal governments occurred.  During this time, the two views 
became discordant and Spain broke into two radical positions.  Consequently when the military 
revolted and civil war began, the war was fought on ideological and cultural fronts.  The 
Nationalists, or rebel side, portrayed the war as a Crusade against the reds of international 
communism.  The Crusade with all its symbolism of Reconquista was supported by the Spanish 
Catholic Church, the Vatican, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany.  The Republic portrayed the war 
as a conflict against a rebellious military that was supported by the forces of international 
fascism.  The Republic was supported by the Soviet Union and by international volunteers.  The 
war deepened the divide with both sides claiming to be the true preservers of Spanish history and 
culture.  The war may also be viewed as a class war between landowners, the military, the clergy 
and workers, tradespeople, and intellectuals.  The victory by Franco and the military only served 
to exacerbate the division.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Mariano José de Larra, “El Día de Difuntos de 1836: Fígaro en el cementerio.” El Español no. 368 (November 2, 
1836). 
3
 Dacia Viejo-Rose, Reconstructing Spain: Cultural Heritage and Memory after Civil War (Eastbourne, U.K.: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 30-35. 
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Following the Civil War, Franco reinforced this division by vindictively bisecting the 
Spanish society into winners and losers, with the losing Republican side being largely without 
rights and excluded from any benefits from the state.  People identified as Republicans were 
subjected to internal exile and worse.
4
  Up to 500,000 Republicans were imprisoned in 
concentration camps.
5
  According to Helen Graham, 20,000 Republican prisoners were forced 
into slave labor to build Franco’s monument, Valle de los Caídos.6  During the transition to 
democracy following Franco’s death, the divisions from the Civil War were papered over by a 
political agreement of de facto amnesty for the transgressions of the Civil War and the Franco 
regime, sealed by a ‘pact of silence.’7  The pact subsequently inhibited the recovery of Civil War 
memory for the next twenty-five years until the turn of the century.  Spain continues to remain 
highly partisan and experiences identity crises.
8
 
Although the idea of “two Spains” substantially reflects a politically divided Spain with 
two sides in opposition and continual conflict, it has been used to describe many social and 
political situations or developments.  Following Franco’s death, there was the idea of a “New 
Spain” applied to becoming a modern Spain, fully in line with mainstream Europe.  There was 
also the idea of an “Old Spain” applied to political and social forces opposing change, especially 
to Francoists.  The term has also been applied to many other tensions in Spain: nationalism 
versus regionalism, Catholic Spain versus secular, a Spain that functions and one that does not, 
modern versus reactionary, and in politics: progressive versus conservative. 
Gunther et al argued that Spain is no longer much different from the main European 
countries.
9
  Indeed, many of the new generation born after Franco see themselves as European 
more than being part of one of the “two Spains.”  However, Spain does retain strong 
conservative and leftist elements and powerful regional forces threatening to break Spain apart.  
Today, Spain remains a multi-factional country with five culturally different regions, four 
languages, four major political parties, substantial illegal immigration, and sporadic political 
violence; all of which continue to create tension.  The “two Spains” concept is especially well 
                                                 
4
 Helen Graham, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Spain’s Memory Wars,” History Today 54, no. 5 (May 2004): 29. 
5
 Sebastiaan Faber, “Revisiting the Past: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Post-Franco Spain, a Review Article 
(Second Part),” Revista Hispánica Moderna 59, no. 1/2 (Jun. – Dec., 2006): 142. 
6
 Graham, “Coming to Terms with the Past,” 29. 
7
 Ibid., 31. 
8
 Felipe Sahagún, “Leaders of Divided Spain Square Off Yet Again,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, August 3, 2014. 
9
 Gunther et al., Democracy in Modern Spain, 5. 
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reflected by the two major political parties: the conservative Popular Party (PP) and the leftist 
Socialist Party (PSOE).  The PSOE won the first national election in 1982 following the initial 
consensus government and continued to lead the government until 1996 when the PP won.  The 
PP ran the government for the next eight years and a routine national election was scheduled for 
March 14, 2004, which the PP was expected to win.  Then tragedy intervened on March 11. 
11-M Attacks 
The morning of March 11, 2004, saw commuters going on their daily trip to work or 
school on the Spanish rail system.  Few people noticed the riders who left duffel bags or 
backpacks on several trains and got off of the trains, leaving their unknown contents behind.  The 
world would find out the contents of these bags from news agencies later in the morning.  At 
7:37 AM, as a train was about to enter the Atocha station in Madrid, three bombs went off.
10
  A 
few seconds later, four additional bombs exploded on another train.  These two attacks left 
nearly a hundred people dead, with numerous casualties.  Emergency crews rushed to the station, 
but they had to deal with another two bombs destroying a train at the nearby El Pozo del Tío 
Raimundo station at 7:41 AM.  7:42 AM saw another bomb explode at the suburban Santa 
Eugenia station.
11
  In total, ten bombs went off and 191 people died and over 1,800 people were 
injured.
12
  Madrid and its suburbs were in chaos with first responders rushing to pull people from 
the twisted ruins of the destroyed trains.  Most Spaniards were extremely shocked by the train 
bombings, which induced a highly emotional climate just prior to the national election.
13
  In fact, 
this series of attacks was the second deadliest terrorist attack in European history and the 
deadliest in Spain.
14
 
Initially, the perpetrators were unknown.  The attack was first blamed on the Basque 
separatist group Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA), which had been behind previous attacks on 
Spanish police, politicians, and civilians.  Mounting evidence proved otherwise, and the blame 
                                                 
10
 Lawrence Wright, “The Terror Web,” New Yorker, August 2, 2004. 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/08/02/the-terror-web.  
11
 Wright, “The Terror Web.” 
12
 Paul Hamilos, “The Worst Islamist Attack in European History,” Guardian, October 31, 2007, accessed July 15, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/31/spain/print. 
13
 José A. Olmeda, “Fear or Falsehood? Framing the 3/11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Electoral Accountability,” 
Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 24/2005, May 5, 2005, 17. 
14
 The deadliest terrorist attack in European history was the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing over Scotland, which 
had 270 deaths accounting for the passengers and those killed by falling debris. 
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was shifted to Islamist terrorists at least inspired by Al Qaeda.
15
  The overwhelming verdict was 
that Islamist terrorists inspired by Al Qaeda perpetrated the attacks.  Part of that conjecture was 
that Al Qaeda imitated the 9/11 attacks via four trains instead of four airplanes, 911 days after 
9/11.
16
 
Research Questions 
Spain has had a long and foundational history of political violence.  Throughout most of 
the twentieth century, Spain was politically unstable.  Following the civil war, the Franco regime 
repression and resistance group terror resulted in the perpetuation of fear.  This fear persisted 
after Franco’s death in 1975 and subsequent return of democratic rule as the past political 
violence and potential for its return, especially military revolt, continued to haunt Spaniards.  
Additionally the memory of the civil war was curbed throughout the Franco regime and for the 
next twenty-five years.  This silent legacy of the memory of political violence, which had 
emerged into the public sphere at the turn of the twenty-first century, intensified following the 
train bombings of 11-M.  This intensification of the breaking of the Civil War silence was aided 
by the election of the PSOE leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, whose grandfather was an 
officer in the Republican Army, was captured by Franco’s Nationalist Army, and was executed 
as a prisoner.
17
 
Considering that the 11-M attacks paled in significance compared to the Spanish Civil 
War, something happened following the attacks that intensified the breaking of the silence of the 
civil war legacy.  Consequently, a variety of questions may be posed.  What were the political 
and societal reactions to 11-M and why did the resultant political controversies continue to the 
present time?  How did the silencing of historical memory during the Franco years and afterward 
relate to the reactions to 11-M and why did the recovery of memory intensify following 11-M?  
What caused the Spanish people’s response to 11-M and its aftermath?  In response to these 
questions, one of the main research areas of emphasis for this thesis is to examine the 
controversial aftermath of 11-M.  Another research area of emphasis is the investigation of the 
                                                 
15
 Hamilos, “The Worst Islamic Attack in European History.” 
16
 Nicholas Manganas, “Mass-Mediated Social Terror in Spain,” Comparative Literature and Culture 9, no. 1 
(March 2007), Article 10: 2. 
17
 Norman Birnbaum, “Spain’s Recent History: Rebirth of a Nation,” The Euromedia Blog, entry posted March 16, 
2004, http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/euromedia/archives/002326.html (accessed July 10, 2014). 
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recovery of memory from the Spanish Civil War.  Although 11-M is not an isolated terrorist 
attack in Spain because of ETA terrorism, it seems atypical compared to the previous ETA 
political violence due to its scale and coordinated attacks.  Due to the massive demonstrations 
following 11-M and the subsequent passing of the Law of Historical Memory in 2007, it seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that recovery of memory following the Franco regime was intensified 
by 11-M and the election of Zapatero.  This law had the purpose of establishing a way to 
preserve both memories of the Spanish Civil War, which had re-emerged as a major political 
issue at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Thesis Objectives 
Gaddis presented the metaphor of history as landscapes, which could be mapped to 
uncover the past.  He contended that structure and process provide the mechanism of history and 
that structure may survive into the present.  It is from these surviving structures that historians 
deduce the processes that produced them.  Gaddis used the metaphor of a camera to see the 
underlying structure of history.
18
  This thesis focuses Gaddis’ camera lens on the structure of 
Spanish duality to investigate the processes that produced the surprising response of the Spanish 
people to 11-M and the intensification of Civil War memory recovery. 
Therefore, this thesis demonstrates that the Madrid terrorist attack and its aftermath 
significantly intensified the recovery of memory and the associated breaking of silence in Spain.  
Secondly, this thesis demonstrates that the Spanish people responded to 11-M with anger instead 
of fear, which is a controversial topic in historiography.  To accomplish these purposes, the 
thesis is divided into two major sections.  The first section discusses the political and social 
controversies following the attacks.  Its purposes are to provide an overview of tensions caused 
by 11-M, analyze the surprising response of the Spanish people to the crisis, and relate those 
tensions to the duality of Spain.  The second section reviews the history of memory and silencing 
following the Spanish Civil War including recent history.  For instance, Faber has written about 
a particularly noteworthy and intense debate concerning Spanish Civil War historical memory 
that took place in Spain in 2010.  The debate indicated a strong conflict between memory and 
                                                 
18
 John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 35; Ibid., 41; Ibid., 129. 
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counter-memory.
19
  Hence, it can be argued that a historical memory war has been taking place 
in Spain regarding the Spanish Civil War and that Spain has remained divided about the Civil 
War.  The purposes of the second section are to analyze why memory recovery intensified after 
11-M, to examine the so-called memory war, and to relate memory recovery to the duality of 
Spain. 
Theory and Definitions Historiography 
 A brief historiography on the definitions of memory, collective memory, silence, 
breaking of silence, recovery of memory, and amnesty as well as a discussion of trauma theory 
will help set the stage and provide focus for the discussion of memory and silence in this thesis.  
Pierre Nora analyzed the relationship between history and memory and argued that memory and 
history were “fundamentally in opposition.”  He defined memory as “life, borne by living 
societies founded in its name.”20  He also mentioned that memory is in constantly changing ideas 
and that it is easily manipulated and altered.  He defined history as “the reconstruction, always 
problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.”21  This distinction between history and 
memory is a major component in the argument over the national narrative of the Spanish Civil 
War.  From a Spanish viewpoint, Salvador Cardús i Ros defined memory as “a set of narratives 
resulting from the social interpretation of reality.”22  From a different perspective, Carolyn Boyd 
visualized memory as a process.  She defined memory as “the process by which people construct 
personal narratives supportive of integrated and efficacious identities.”23  The differing 
definitions of memory boil down to this: memory is the result of recollections from individuals 
or groups of certain events or a series of events and how they are portrayed after they occur.  
History, it could be argued, is generally the record of events contextualized within the most 
accepted memory of those events as well as documentation or other evidence of the events.  
Spanish historians, especially those who focus on social history, discuss the memory of the 
Spanish Civil War as being multiple collective memories.  This is because the memories of 
                                                 
19
 Sebastiaan Faber, “Raising the Specter of ‘Argentinization’: The Temptation of Spanish Exceptionalism,” 
Hispanic Issues On Line, (Fall 2012): 119-123. 
20
 Pierre Nora, “Between History and Memory: les lieux de mémoire,” Representations 26 (1989): 8. 
21
 Nora, “Between History and Memory,” 3. 
22
 Salvador Cardús i Ros, “Politics and the Invention of Memory, For a Sociology of the Transition to Democracy in 
Spain,” in Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy, ed. 
Joan Ramon Resina (Atlanta: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2000), 23. 
23
 Carolyn P. Boyd, “The Politics of History and Memory in Democratic Spain,” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 617 (May, 2008): 134. 
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wartime experience are diverse and divided, making unity toward a national narrative difficult if 
not impossible. 
 For example, Paloma Aguilar argued that the memory of the war is collective “which 
does not mean that all of the persons who make up the same group have an equal factual memory 
of a particular historical episode.”24  Therefore, collective memory differs depending on groups 
of people and depending on the status of a person in society.  Elżbieta Hałas described social 
memory as the memory of a whole society, which is comprised of multiple collective memories.  
She defined collective memory as “the processes of communication and symbolic 
representations of the past experiences of a group.”25  She also indicated that collective memory 
has three important functions: “legitimization of the social order, formation of collective 
identities, and idealization of values.”26  Hałas referenced Paul Connerton in discussing how 
collective memory is created by generation to generation knowledge transmittal of group 
experience and how the vehicles of collective memory are generally in the form of 
commemorations.
27
  It is collective memory that differentiates social groups and group identity 
transformation occurs through commemoration changes about their origins.  The intensity of 
commemoration has a direct bearing on collective memory.  When commemoration fades, 
collective amnesia or oblivion begins.  Hałas argued that there are two trends in collective 
memory: localization and globalization.  Globalizing of collective memory was an outcome of 
the world wars, caused by “common frameworks of traumatic social experiences.”  These 
traumatic experiences produced deep divisions in collective memory, many of which became 
global after the Second World War and under the influence of the Cold War.   Hence the politics 
of collective memory are no longer bound to the state, but are becoming global.  When collective 
memory involves memory of trauma, it can have substantial power and collective memory 
conflicts generally open historical and political divisions.  Indeed, the politics of memory can 
become revolutionary.  Hałas specified that there are two ways to practice the politics of memory 
when conflict over the memory of trauma is involved and reconciliation is needed.  One way is 
through amnesia or amnesty, which may particularly have utility during transitions.  The other 
                                                 
24
 Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: the Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy, trans. 
Mark Oakley (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 1. 
25
 Elżbieta Hałas, “Issues of Social Memory and their Challenges in the Global Age,” Time & Society 17, no. 1 
(2008): 105. 
26
 Hałas, “Issues of Social Memory,” 110. 
27
 Ibid., 107. 
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way is through justice by investigating the past and coming to an acceptable legal remedy or 
forgiveness.  Both ways have been practiced.
28
 
 Collective memory is related to national identity by how identity development occurs 
through listening to memories, standardized education, commemorations, popular art, historical 
literature and films, and media.  Hence, problems of memory are problems of identity.  National 
governments typically attempt to create an official public memory that forms a preferred version 
of the past.
29
  The Franco regime actively worked to shape public memory and the official 
representation of the Civil War became that of the Nationalist victors.  As such, the Republican 
experience of loss, voices from their own past, and history, were over-shadowed by that of the 
Nationalists.  This was especially true at commemorations, through narratives in education and 
in Catholic churches, and at statues and memorials to the Civil War.  One major example is the 
Valley of the Fallen (which memorialized the Nationalist victors and became the tomb of 
Franco); in reference to which Aguilar quoted Nora by stating that it could be considered a “site 
of memory” or a social deposit where personal experiences shape tradition “prior to the existence 
of individuals of subsequent historical periods.”30  The storing of these individual memories is 
what shapes collective memory about events.  Collective memories and individual memories 
influence each other and “collective memories are periodically revived by means of ceremonies 
or public rituals which aim to legitimise a present rooted in a specific tradition.”31  The revival 
and perpetuation of collective memory also contributes to the forgetting or over-shadowing of 
other memories which can be viewed as “inconvenient” for the accepted memory.  This type of 
over-shadowing occurs on a regular basis with historical events, and is known as silencing. 
 Silences about the past take place in all societies.  It is impossible for every detail of 
every event that has occurred in human history to be documented.  Sometimes events which 
should have, could have, or would have been recorded remain unrecognized and/or buried.  In 
some cases, it is accidental as in the case of a letter being misplaced when it is taken to an 
archive or is destroyed by the passage of time.  On the other hand, there are times when evidence 
                                                 
28
 Hałas, “Issues of Social Memory,” 105-115. 
29
 Viejo-Rose, Reconstructing Spain, 10-11. 
30
 Pierre Nora, Les Liuex de Mémoire (Gallimard : Paris, 1984) in Memory and Amnesia, ed. Paloma Aguilar, 7. 
31
 Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia, 7. 
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is destroyed or events covered up in an attempt to make that aspect “forgotten” by future 
generations.  Jay Winter defined silence as:  
…a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally 
used in everyday life are not spoken.  The circle around this space is described by groups 
of people who at one point in time deem it appropriate that there is a difference between 
the sayable and the unsayable, or the spoken and unspoken, and that such a distinction 
can and should be maintained and observed over time.  Such people codify and enforce 
norms which reinforce the injunction against breaking into the inner space of the circle of 
silence.
32
   
Michel-Rolph Trouillot said that “silences enter the process of historical production at four 
crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact 
assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of narratives); and 
the moment of retrospective significance (the making of history) in the final instance.”33  In 
Spain, silences play a major role in the remembrance of the Spanish Civil War and are a result of 
all four crucial moments of the production of silence.  The success of the Franco regime over 
other regimes, such as those of Mussolini and Hitler, was because the regime was in charge of all 
these crucial moments until the 1970s.  It can be said that the strength of the regime allowed it to 
promote its account of the Civil War to a status of privilege. 
 A key duality struggle faced by Spaniards following the transition from the dictatorship 
to democracy was dealing with the compounded silences about the atrocities of the Spanish Civil 
War and the Franco dictatorship and the need to break those silences if society was to be healed.  
The breaking of silence is when topics/traumas which were too taboo to be openly talked about, 
at one point or another, become acceptable within the established framework of society and 
politics.  Ricoeur equated forgetting to silence, which he considered to be blocked memory, with 
the breaking of silence being the unblocking of the silenced memory.
34
  This happens, as 
explained by Winter, because the silence could have been put in place “in order to suspend or 
                                                 
32
 Jay Winter, “Thinking about Silence,” in Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century, 
ed. Efrat Ben Ze’ev, Ruth Ginio, and Jay Winter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 
33
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon University 
Press, 1995), 26. 
34
 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and Daniel Pellauer (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2004), 448. 
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truncate open conflict over the meaning and/or justification of violence, either domestic or trans-
national.”35  Vincent discussed how the passage of time is necessary for difficult subjects to be 
discussed politically or publically before the silence may be broken.  Often it is several 
generations after the event before it can be examined closely and it can emerge outside the realm 
of academia, which was the case with the Spanish Civil War and the Franco era.  Vincent related 
that the breaking of silence is about confronting and revealing the past, which has been hidden or 
kept from public knowledge.
 36
  The purpose of the breaking of silence is the recovery, or 
rehabilitation, of hidden memory. 
 Ricoeur described remembering (recovery of memory) as a moment of awakening and as 
a moment of recognition.
37
  In other words, recovery of memory happens when the forgotten or 
the silenced is recognized.  Ricoeur also maintained that the process of memory recovery is 
related to the process of mourning.  He asserted that collective memory must detach from 
personal or retention memory for the past to separate from the present.
38
  Vincent saw the 
process of memory recovery in Spain as “a renegotiation of the public narratives of the 
dictatorship and the Civil War” or that it “is not a recovery of a lost past but a reordering of 
historical narratives accomplished in a changing present.”39  Labanyi viewed memory recovery 
in Spain as the recuperation of memory.  She related memory recovery to uncovering the 
“unfinished business” of the past.40  Hałas characterized memory recovery as the regaining of 
collective memory from that which had been previously hidden.  She noted that “there can be a 
discrepancy between the memory of the past of a particular group and the historiography of its 
experiences.”41  Blakeley portrayed memory recovery in Spain as the re-emergence of that which 
was long dead and buried.  She said that these memories were not forgotten, but had been 
sidelined until the political opportunity structure (Tarrow) was ready for its re-emergence.
42
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 Winter, “Thinking about silence,” 4-5. 
36
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 A dictionary definition of amnesty is “a general pardon granted by a government, 
especially for political offenses.”43  It originates via Latin from the Greek amnēstia meaning not 
remembered or oblivion.  A dictionary definition of amnesia is “partial or total loss of memory, 
usually resulting from shock, psychological disturbance, brain injury, or illness” and it originates 
from the Greek amnēsia meaning without memory or forgetfulness.44  Although the Greek roots 
of amnesty and amnesia are essentially the same, the English definitions are not.  Paul Ricoeur 
argued that the boundary between amnesty (forgiving) and amnesia (forgetting) has been blurred 
by institutionalized forms of amnesty, which he called commanded forgetting.
45
  He further 
stated:  
The significance of amnesty is quite different.  To begin with, it brings to conclusion 
serious political disorders affecting civil peace – civil wars, revolutionary periods, violent 
changes of political regimes – violence that the amnesty is supposed to interrupt… With 
regard to its content, amnesty is directed toward a category of infractions and crimes 
committed on all sides during the period of sedition.  In this respect, it functions as a sort 
of selective and punctual prescription which leaves outside of its field certain categories 
of lawbreakers.
46
   
Contrary to the stated aim of reconciliation and peace, institutional forgetting when clothed as 
amnesty, has attempted to bury the memory of the past, and as such, has entailed a secret pact to 
deny memory and was no longer forgiving.
47
  Commanded forgetting is in effect commanded 
amnesia and as such, private and collective memory would lose the healthy identity crisis that 
could allow reclamation of the past and discharge of its trauma.  Ricoeur finished his discussion 
by stating: “the boundary between amnesty and amnesia can be preserved in its integrity through 
the work of memory, which work is completed by the work of mourning and guided by the spirit 
of forgiveness.”48 
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 As previously mentioned, amnesty is not forgetting.  Winter discussed that amnesty 
attempts to transcend revenge paralysis and should be utilized when there is a consensus that 
amnesty results in more justice than continuation of conflict.  If consensus fractures over time, 
then the amnesty may be renegotiated.  Although opening the terms of amnesty seems counter to 
the concept of forgiveness lasting forever, Winter referenced that this happened in Argentina in 
2005 when amnesty laws were declared unconstitutional.  Regarding Civil War silencing in 
Spain, he mentioned that the uncovering of mass Republican graves has begun to sever the 
amnesty.
49
 
 Trauma is a serious physical or mental wound or shock to a person, either from violence 
or an accident.  Sometimes, the mental or emotional stress from the trauma produces a 
substantial, long-lasting, disordered psychic or behavioral state in a person.
50
  Some survivors of 
combat relive the horror of experienced traumatic events in flashbacks and nightmares.  This 
condition was in the past termed “shell shock,” but was changed to the term post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) following the Vietnam War.  The advent of total war in the First and Second 
World War extended the horror of war to civilians and many suffered PTSD after experiencing 
unimaginable brutality from attacks on cities and towns.  Survivors of the Nazi genocide and 
prisoners of war likewise experienced horrendous atrocities and many suffered from PTSD.  
Classic models of stress theory, stress sensitization, and fear conditional have been adequate to 
explain the biological process of PTSD, but have not been able to explain individual differences 
in reaction to trauma.
51
  A physical or psychological threat induces an expedient and efficient 
natural response in everyone, since this is a survival mechanism.  Normally, the duration of this 
response to stress is limited since prolonged stress may potentially be damaging.  However, in 
the case of PTSD, the physiological response to a stressor event does not seem to turn off.
52
  
Why this happens to some people and not others has galvanized research into whether or not 
genetic differences may account for different reactions to trauma and associated PTSD. 
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 Recent research in the new science of epigenetics has found that trauma can induce 
changes in a person’s DNA, which are inheritable.  Studies of children of Holocaust survivors 
have shown that they are more likely to have psychological distress and that some have inherited 
genetic changes caused by the trauma suffered by their parents.  The epigenetic modifications are 
believed to be a direct result of DNA methylation.
53
  These gene alterations may be why trauma 
victims have such long-lasting PTSD.
54
  Therefore, it is likely that intergenerational effects of 
trauma have at least two causes: inherited gene modifications and upbringing or learning factors 
from growing up with traumatized parents. 
 Individual exposure to direct traumatic incidents is related to psychological distress 
including PTSD, but does exposure to mass traumatic incidents cause similar stress and a risk of 
psychological problems?  Studies have indeed found higher levels of PTSD among people who 
were exposed to the trauma as a direct witness, having a friend or relative killed, or to a lesser 
extent having been involved in the rescue.
55
  In the case of long-term stress exposure, e.g. 
extended combat or political repression, people have to employ long-term adaptations to handle 
the adversity.  Many of the adaptations may be permanent, e.g. neural and genetic changes, 
which may make normal stress response systems hyper-reactive, increasing the risk for PTSD.
56
  
Long-term stress is therefore especially damaging. 
 Trauma theory contends that for a situation to be traumatic to a person, it must be more 
than simply a situation that renders helplessness: it must also include a betrayal of trust.
57
  
Together, this entails two shattered assumptions about themselves and the environment or world: 
personal invulnerability and perception that the world is safe.  These assumptions are overturned 
by the traumatic situation and psychological distress arises from new feelings in which the 
person sees themselves as vulnerable to victimization and that the world is treacherous and 
dangerous.
58
  Partaking in violence or witnessing violence can provoke a feeling of shame, which 
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can be as traumatic as being a victim and hence potentially leading to PTSD.  Holocaust 
survivors, who escaped brutality, but witnessed it, said that they drowned in shame.  Combat 
veterans who have killed or terrorized civilians have also expressed having strong feelings of 
shame.
59
 
 Violence is typically foundational for nations and survival of the nation requires that its 
citizens will voluntarily fight or will accept conscription.  In return, the nation offers security to 
its citizens.  However, many nations or even quasi-states, particularly with autocratic rulers, 
abuse their power over their citizens and break the security trust.  This political abuse can range 
from exclusion from opportunity and benefits; to imprisonment, torture, and death’ to enforced 
participation in atrocities.  Depending on the degree of stress, political abuse can cause 
psychological distress and PTSD.  Political abuse victims, as evident by the Holocaust survivors, 
have a compelling need to tell their story and to attempt to right the wrong done to them.  Due to 
the powerless state of survivors at the time of the trauma, being able to speak and pursue justice 
afterwards is their way of resistance and speaking helps alleviate psychological distress.  On the 
other hand, political authorities may feel threatened by survivor testimony and may take action to 
silence them.  Recovery of power is important to the recovery of trauma victims.  However, 
survivors of great trauma never fully recover trust and live in fear of the return of trauma.
60
 
 Memorials are made following wars.  If victory was achieved, commemorations, films, 
books, and museums speak of the honor and sacrifice of the military and war effort.  Even the 
losers build museums.  The commemorations serve to strengthen the nation and to ease 
mourning for the fallen.
61
  But how are victims, especially of genocide, commemorated?  
Generally, silence is broken and the victims’ stories are told through museums, films, books, art, 
and at trauma sites.  Justice may be pursued through truth and reconciliation commissions and 
courts, but sometimes these become spectacles and the victims’ stories may become 
sensationalized creating more trauma for the victims.  Television is often a hindrance to hearing 
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the true voices.
62
  Another hindrance is if a memory is politicized.  The controversies which are 
explored in the next section show the effect politics had on the memory of 11-M. 
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CONTROVERSIAL AFTERMATH OF 11-M 
Ten years later, there are few visible signs of what happened on that day. Even the 
shadow of things, commemoration, has a discreet presence. There is the 11-metre-high crystal 
monolith erected in tribute to the victims outside Atocha station where one of the trains 
exploded; but the memorial across the street is perhaps more moving. Known as the Forest of 
Remembrance, it is a little park with olive trees and cypresses, one for each of the victims. It is 
calm and collected; a place to be, rather than a monument to observe. 
I wish the legacy of 11 March was as simple as that park. Grief is easy to share, but when 
it comes to meaning Spain’s memory of the Madrid train bombings appears fatally tainted by 
domestic politics; and when one thinks of the magnitude of the tragedy it is almost embarrassing 
to explain why. 
What is unfortunate is that the controversy continues to affect the way in which the 
tragedy is remembered in Spain. Official commemorations avoid speeches. If there are speeches, 
specifics are left out. What was an act of mass murder tends to be treated in terms of abstract 
evil. But there might be a silver lining here too. In a way, this lack of interpretation has made it 
more universal – like Guernica, hanging on a wall a few hundred metres up the street. 
Miguel-Anxo Murado: Madrid Bombings, 10 Years On, 2014
63
 
 
As Murado so succinctly states in his Guardian article, the aftermath of 11-M produced 
political and social controversies that remain to the present time.  How did this happen?  Why 
did this happen?  This chapter seeks to answer those questions. 
Immediate Aftermath Timeline 
The four day period immediately following the 11-M attack was highly consequential.  
Typically following terrorist attacks, everyone including the opposition political parties rally in 
solidarity behind the government and its response to such an attack with only a few dissenting 
voices, as was seen in the response to 9/11.  That solidarity initially happened in Spain, but 
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began to break down within twenty-four hours of the attack.  A summary of events can provide 
insight into the immediate aftermath of 11-M. 
Thursday, March 11, 2004 
Shortly after the train bombings, the key political leaders in Spain attributed the attacks to 
ETA including the PSOE opposition leader Zapatero, President of the Government Aznar, PP 
leader Rajoy, and the Basque regional government President.  Aznar set up a Crisis Cabinet 
which excluded Congress, Defense, State Security, Intelligence, and opposition political parties.  
Aznar called for solidarity demonstrations the afternoon of March 12.  The Minister of the 
Interior, Ángel Acebes, became the government spokesperson.  In a press conference, Acebes 
began to build a case that the perpetrators were the ETA.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs began 
the process to obtain a UN Security Council resolution condemning ETA for the attacks.  
However, ETA spokesman, Arnaldo Otegui, released a statement denying ETA involvement.
64
  
Aznar held a press conference.  In his opening statement, he said: “We will defeat them.  Let 
nobody have any doubt.  We will succeed in putting an end to the terrorist band, with the 
strength of the rule of law and the unity of all Spaniards.”65  His reference to a “terrorist band” 
implied ETA.  During the evening, Aznar called the editors of Spain’s newspapers and 
confidently told them that ETA was “behind the attacks.”66 
The police investigation had a quick break when police in Alcalá de Henares were tipped 
off by a witness who directed the authorities to a white Renault van that had been left that 
morning at the train station.
67
  Though the authorities were initially suspicious of ETA having 
committed the attack, they were baffled by the lack of warning (in direct opposition to previous 
attacks) and the poor preparation (plates on the van did not match registration of similar 
vehicles) which was out-of-character for the Basque terrorist group.  However the investigation 
was sidetracked when an explosive informant at the scene stated that the bombs used titadyne 
explosive, which implicated the ETA.
68
  The white Renault van found at Alcalá de Henares rail 
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station was searched by authorities and within it they found a tape of Quranic recitations in 
Arabic, traces of an outdated explosive type (Goma-2), and seven fuses made in Spain.
69
  Goma-
2 had formerly been used by ETA, but many years before this attack.  Police officials determined 
that the designation of titadyne as the bombing explosive was not correct and they opened a new 
investigation direction, but without halting the ETA investigation.
70
 
During the evening, the media started questioning the government claim of ETA 
perpetuation.  Radio station Cadena Ser broadcast a rumor that a suicide bomber had been found 
among the bodies.  Although the rumor was denied, the suicide bomber story coincided with a 
story from London that Al Qaeda had released a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.  
Norwegian intelligence following up on the Madrid attack obtained a document posted on a 
jihadist web page the previous December which discussed the possibility of an attack on Spain.  
This document had been drafted as early as September and it mentioned other minor attacks 
which had occurred on Spaniards in Iraq.  The document provided to the Spanish authorities 
made mention of an historic Islamic figure by the name of Abu Dujana, a companion of the 
Prophet.  This name had been evoked by other jihadists and suicide bombers in other attacks.
71
  
Though the authors of the document were not known, reference was made to the assumed name 
of the man who on March 13 would identify himself as a member of the group responsible for 
the attack. 
The events of the day of the bombings indicated that the first political response to the 
crisis was solidarity with the government in blaming ETA.  The ETA was quick to deny they 
were behind the bombings.  Information flowing from outside of Spain began to indicate that 
maybe Islamists were involved.  The media began to react to that other information in the 
evening and began to sow the first seeds of doubt. 
Friday, March 12, 2004 
Overnight, as the police were sorting through belongings found on the trains, a police 
officer discovered a sports bag with Goma-2 explosives surrounded by nails and screws inside.  
Along with the explosives, a cellular phone was found.  The officers took a chip from the phone 
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which showed the most recent dialed numbers.  Tracing the calls, they were able to map out a 
network of Arab and African immigrants, many of whom were already known to Spanish 
intelligence. 
In the morning, Zapatero started to criticize the government for not responding to the 
potential that Al Qaeda was behind the attack.  He also asked the government to be more open in 
the sharing of information.  Aznar held a press conference at which he said that all lines of 
investigation were being pursued, but he attacked the ETA spokesman by saying: “The 
government gives no credit to spokespersons of ETA and its illegal satellite organizations.” A 
journalist asked about a statement from the PSOE Secretary of Organization accusing Aznar and 
the government of hiding information.  Aznar denied the accusation and mentioned that 
information would be provided about the Arabic tape as soon as it was analyzed.  He again 
reiterated the ETA blame narrative with an emphasis on the thirty-year history of ETA terrorism 
and the similar modus operandi of this attack.
72
 
In the afternoon, word began to leak about the new turn in the investigation.  
Demonstrators soon formed in front of the Atocha station to protest the war in Iraq, which some 
linked to the bombing.  As the war had been unpopular in Spain from the beginning and had 
been pushed through by Aznar without reaching a consensus with the other parties, many 
Spaniards blamed Aznar and the PP party for putting Spain in a position to be attacked.
73
   
Over 11,000,000 people, which was over twenty-five percent of the total Spanish 
population, turned out for the government called unity demonstrations.  But unity was breaking 
down.  In some cities, people demonstrated against ETA, but in Barcelona, PP politicians were 
attacked, and in Madrid people asked for the truth.
74
  Some of the media began questioning 
whether ETA was behind the attack.  El País, the largest daily newspaper in Spain, editorialized 
that if Al Qaeda was responsible for the attack, it would be an extension of the Iraq War onto 
Spanish soil.  The editorial blamed the government for using the ETA attack narrative as a means 
to improve the PP position in the election.
75
  The conservative daily newspaper, El Mundo, was 
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also critical of the government for so quickly settling on ETA responsibility and especially 
criticized the Minister of the Interior for allowing his prejudices to overrule the data.
76
 
In an evening press conference, the Interior Minister, Ángel Acebes, continued to insist in 
public that ETA was still the prime suspect of the attack; even though the police investigation 
showed that ETA could not have been directly involved.  Acebes went as far to state that “so far, 
none of the intelligence services or security forces we have contacted have provided reliable 
information to the effect that it could have been an Islamic terrorist organization.”77  However, 
anonymous callers claiming to represent ETA called into Basque newspapers and television 
stations during the day to deny responsibility for the attacks.  Spaniards came out in force that 
night to protest the violence and the Iraq war, with many asking “Who is the author of these 
attacks… Why is the government lying to us?”78 
In this second day of the crisis, the PSOE opposition leader started to question the 
government narrative.  The ETA more intensively denied they were the bombers.  The police 
investigation was efficiently proceeding and started a second line of investigation into possible 
Islamist terrorists.  The media initiated editorials and stories that began to counter government 
claims.  The public massively responded to the government request for demonstrations, but some 
of the demonstrations turned into protests.  The government was losing control of its narrative. 
Saturday, March 13, 2004 
In the morning, following the clue of the cellular phone card recovered from the bomb 
containing sports bag, the police investigation led to a store managed by two Indians and from 
there to a booth handled by three Moroccans, who were arrested.
79
  One of the Moroccans was 
Jamal Zougam, who had been under surveillance for suspected ties to Al Qaeda.
80
   
Although the day before an election in Spain is a day of reflection with prohibition of 
electioneering, demonstrators in the afternoon surrounded many PP offices accusing the 
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government of lying.
81
  The El País newspaper editorialized that the government blaming of 
ETA was only a hypothesis and not based on actual clues, which the newspaper listed.  The 
Minister of the Interior was criticized for his continuing stance on ETA blame.
82
  The El Mundo 
newspaper editorialized that both investigation lines should remain open and recommended that 
people vote for Rajoy.
83
 
Acebes, in a press conference, admitted that two lines of investigation were open, but he 
continued to insist that ETA was the responsible group.  During the evening, Acebes released a 
statement announcing the arrests of terrorist suspects, but did not close the ETA investigation.  
Radio station Cadena Ser broadcast that large numbers of people were demonstrating against the 
government in most major Spanish cities.  Rajoy, the PP candidate for President of the 
Government released a statement condemning the demonstrators surrounding PP offices.  He 
also asked the people to vote for the PP party because they provide the best “defense against 
terrorism.”  The PSOE party released a statement saying that: “Spanish citizens deserve a 
government that does not lie to them, that always tells the truth… We will never, never, use 
terrorism as a political weapon… We have not convoked the demonstrations.”84 
The police investigation began to solidify on Islamists after a man in the evening called a 
television station to notify them of a videotape placed in a trash bin near Madrid’s main mosque; 
a video in which a masked speaker stated:  
We declare our responsibility for what has occurred in Madrid, exactly two-and-a-half 
years after the attacks on New York and Washington. It is a response to your 
collaboration with the criminals Bush and his allies.  This is a response to the crimes that 
you have caused in the world, and specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there will be 
more, if God wills it.  You love life and we love death, which gives an example of what 
the Prophet Muhammad said.  If you don’t stop your injustices, more and more blood will 
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flow and these attacks will seem very small compared to what can occur in what you call 
terrorism.
85
   
This masked speaker identified himself as the “military spokesman for Al Qaeda in 
Europe,” and named himself as Abu Dujan al-Afghani.86  At this point, Spaniards knew that it 
was not likely that ETA was behind the attacks due to the released information on the attack and 
its details and the PSOE were openly accusing their opponents of lying about the investigation.
87
  
The following day would show that a portion of the Spanish electorate felt they were betrayed by 
their leaders. 
In the third day of the crisis, the government narrative unraveled.  The police made their 
first arrests of possible Moroccan terrorists.  The media became more critical of the government.  
The PSOE opposition accused the government of lying.  However, the government remained 
entrenched in their narrative of blaming ETA.  Protests against the government continued 
throughout the country. 
Sunday, March 14, 2004 – Election Day 
At daybreak, demonstrators continued their protest against the PP government.  The 
electorate was motivated, especially young and first-time voters.  A larger-than-expected turnout 
of voters, seventy-six percent of the electorate, pushed the PSOE ahead of the Popular Party to 
oust the PP government and herald in the government of Zapatero.
88
  Most of the increased 
turnout voted for the PSOE.  The PP had nearly the same number of votes as in the 2000 
election.  Zapatero then fulfilled his election promise to bring Spanish troops home from Iraq. 
Two weeks after the election on April 2nd, a security guard found a plastic bag filled 
with Goma-2 next to the tracks for the AVE high-speed train.  These explosives had been wired 
incorrectly and if they had gone off, casualties would have been at least double the amounts for 
the Madrid attack.
89
  The presence of the explosives two weeks after the initial attack, especially 
in the aftermath of an apparent political victory for the terrorists in ending Spanish-involvement 
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in Iraq, showed that the terrorist group was not interested in merely attaining a short-term 
political goal, which had already been achieved: they also wanted to exact revenge and have 
more blood spilled.  The remote detonation present at the tracks also showed that the terrorists 
were interested in carrying out other attacks and not simply committing suicide.  Fernando 
Reinares argued in an opinion piece published in April 2014 that the train bombings and the 
discovered bomb by the AVE tracks showed that the full plan of attack by the terrorists was not 
complete.
90
  Hence, the motivation for the 11-M attacks was to conduct political violence against 
Spain for a broader terrorism purpose.  The day after this failed explosive was discovered 
authorities found and confronted the suspected terrorists in the Madrid immigrant suburb of 
Leganés. 
At 3:00 PM on April 3
rd
, police went up to an apartment building in Leganés and saw a 
young Moroccan man taking the trash out.  This man suddenly yelled something in Arabic and 
ran away from the police, so quickly that he could not be caught.  Voices then yelled out from an 
upper floor “Allahu Akhbar!” and gunfire rained down on the police below.91  The police quickly 
closed down the area, evacuated the surrounding buildings, and heavy police firepower 
(including tanks and helicopters) moved into the neighborhood to start the siege of the apartment 
building.  Throughout the six-hour siege the police tried to negotiate with the terrorists, the 
terrorists tried to get their suicide to be “morally sanctioned” by an Islamic cleric imprisoned in 
Britain, and Abu Dujan al-Afghani tried to salvage his operation by making further demands of 
the Spanish government.
92
  In the end, at 9:05 PM, the police stormed the apartment and ordered 
the men to come out.
93
  When they did not come out, the police destroyed the lock on the door 
and fired tear gas into the room.  Almost simultaneously, an explosion rocked the apartment and 
ended the siege. 
The explosion came from inside of the room, later discovered by the police to have been 
from Goma-2 explosives and detonators which were similar to those used in the train bombings, 
and resulted in the immediate deaths of the terrorists and one police officer.  Alongside the 
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explosives, the police were also able to locate a videotape in the wreckage.  Piecing the remains 
of the tape together, they were able to view the final statement of three of the members of the 
cell.  This cell identified itself as “the brigade situated in Al Andalus” and that they would 
“continue our jihad until martyrdom in the land of Tariq ibn Ziyad.”94  This reference to Muslim 
Spain after the conquest of the Moors in the eighth century and prior to La Reconquista in the 
fifteenth century paralleled the references to the Muslim past in Spain that Al Qaeda made in 
messages directed at the West, in which the radicals deemed it necessary to recover the formerly 
Muslim lands of “Al-Andalus” from Spain.95  The political and social unrest created by the 
attacks was only beginning. 
11-M Historiography 
 Historiography on 11-M and its aftermath is relatively scarce with only a few published 
books and a handful of dissertations and theses.  Immediately following the attacks, there was a 
large volume of journalistic articles followed by academic articles.  An academic study by José 
A. Olmeda into why the PP government immediately placed the blame for the attack on ETA 
found that the PP was running a narrative during the election campaigning that highlighted their 
record on ‘the fight against terrorism’ with candidates making accusations that the nationalist 
PNV party, which governed the Basque country, was using the threat of ETA attacks to further 
their power.  The narrative also attacked the PSOE for being lenient on terrorism and for being 
aligned with Catalonian separatism.  Furthermore, Olmeda reported that following an ETA 
announcement on February 18, 2004, of a ceasefire in Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Interior 
responded by declaring a ‘maximum terrorism alert’ with a prediction that there would be a 
terrorist attack ostensibly by ETA before the March 14 election.  The recent history of ETA also 
greatly influenced the government in their initial reactions.  One example was that on December 
24, 2003, ETA planted two bombs made of twenty-four kilograms of titadyne (commercial brand 
of dynamite) in backpacks on an intercity train to Madrid to explode twenty minutes after arrival 
at the Chamartin Station.  The titadyne had been stolen in France.  A second example was that on 
February 28, 2004, a van containing five hundred six kilograms of homemade explosive and 
thirty kilograms of titadyne was stopped in Cañaveras.  The van was intended to produce a 
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massive explosion near Alcaláde Henares, which is where the bombs were planted on three of 
the four trains on 11-M.  The similarities of these two ETA incidents to 11-M likely factored in 
the government’s reaction to 11-M.96   
Olmeda also examined the elections and how the results of the elections were influenced 
by the attacks, as well as how the parties were able to use the attacks to their electoral advantage.  
He argued that the bombings had a massive impact on the elections due to the framing of the 
attack, the mobilization against terrorism, and flash mobs which descended on PP election 
offices in the days following the attacks.
97
  He concluded that the opposition parties were 
successful in framing the government’s political support for the Iraq war as belligerence before 
the attack and the failure of the government to counter-frame this argument, which resulted in the 
PP taking the blame for the security crisis in the days following the bombings.
98
 
Luis Moreno studied the impact of 11-M on the 2004 election and on regional politics.  
He mentioned that the usual outcome of elections in the time of crisis is to support the incumbent 
government, but the opposite occurred following 11-M.  He argued that the PP government faced 
a political dilemma with two options.  The first was if the PP disclosed that an Islamist 
organization had attacked Spain, then Aznar’s vastly unpopular decision to send soldiers to Iraq 
would become a damaging issue for the PP in the election.  The second option was to assert that 
ETA was to blame, which would reinforce the popular and successful PP hardline stance on ETA 
and would be advantageous for PP in the election.  The second option was selected and was 
propagated to the media by Aznar and his spokesman Acebes.  Moreno’s study of the election 
found that young, first-time voters and leftist abstainers responded to the apparent manipulation 
of information by the PP government and mobilized to vote for the PSOE.  The high voter turn-
out was not the highest in Spain’s history, but it was on par with other elections of great 
importance in 1977 (first election after Franco), 1982 (first election after initial transition), and 
1996 (first conservative win).  Moreno also studied the impact of 11-M on regional politics with 
a focus on ETA.  He reported that the ETA cancelled a plan to explode four car bombs in Madrid 
in June 2004, because there remained utmost outrage and revulsion over the 11-M attacks.  Then 
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the ETA suffered key losses in October 2004 when France arrested its top leaders.  
Subsequently, the ETA maintained a low profile.
99
 
Teemu Sinkkonen conducted a case study of the political response to the Madrid terrorist 
attack.  In his study, he dissected the poll surveys about those who changed their opinions on the 
election based on the attack.  According to one survey, 21.5% of respondents said that the attack 
influenced the elections much more or to a certain extent but only 13.5% of those who responded 
that way actually changed their voting behavior.
100
  However, Sinkkonen argued that this was 
different from most surveys and interviews in which “people do not tend to explain their action 
through fear or commotion.”  He brought up differing views on the role of emotion in political 
decision making by historians Edurne Uriarte and George Marcus.  Uriarte interpreted the 
commotion caused by the attack as “paradoxically” redirected from the terrorists towards a 
government that was unable to protect its own citizens.  Marcus, on the other hand, found that 
people are “able to act rationally just because they are emotional;” thus emotional responses lead 
to rationality and that people who are in a negative affective state (emotional mood state of 
distress or having negative emotions) are “more likely to engage in causal reasoning” about the 
event causing them to be in that state than those who are in a positive affective state (emotional 
mood state of pleasurable engagement with the environment or having positive emotions).
101
   
Sinkkonen concluded that emotion causes people to search for information as a way of 
coping with events and that due to the outcome of the complexity of the aftermath of the Madrid 
train bombings, people found voting to be the best way to “regain their sense of security and 
avoid fear of future threat.”  He also found that the structure of government, wherein the winning 
party forms the government and thus the Prime Minister becomes the figurehead, makes it easier 
for people to “blame the government alone” if things go wrong.102  Another of Sinkkonen’s 
conclusions was that the PSOE would not have won the 2004 election if the terrorist attack had 
not occurred.  However, he also concluded that the terrorists did not cause the PP government to 
lose the election.  Instead, it was a failure of crisis government by the PP.  Sinkkonen attributed 
                                                 
99
 Luis Moreno, “The Madrid Bombings in the Domestic and Regional Politics of Spain,” Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 16 (2005): 67-72. 
100
 Teemu Sinkkonen, “Political Responses to Terrorism: Case Study on the Madrid Terrorist Attack on March 11, 
2004, and Its Aftermath” (PhD diss., University of Tampere, 2009), 203-204. 
101
 Sinkonnen, “Political Responses to Terrorism,” 204-209. 
102
 Ibid., 214. 
28 
 
the failure to Aznar’s exclusion of opposition political parties from the crisis government.  The 
excluded opposition quickly found cause to question the government’s reports and to obtain the 
support of the media in appealing to public emotions.  Once the public saw that the information 
flowing from the PP government was not congruent, the response became angry and networks 
mobilized in protest.  Sinkkonen also found that the PSOE may not have won the election if they 
had supported Aznar in the Iraq War.  The voters needed a credible foreign policy option to vote 
for PSOE.  Aznar and the PP government failed to anticipate the highly emotional reaction of the 
people following the shock of 11-M.
103
 
Among the research articles about the concept of “two Spains,” Sebastiaan Faber and 
Felipe Sahagún have noted that the concept of a binary Spain has remained present in Spanish 
historiography and society.
104
  However, Santos Juliá who has published extensively on the 
subject of “two Spains” has more recently surprisingly stated that the concept of “two Spains” 
may be disappearing.
105
  He bases this observation on the loss of the Spanish traditions of 
intellectuals publishing competing historical essays and for not engaging in public speaking.  
Instead, Spanish intellectuals are more similar to other Western intellectuals and are publishing 
in narrower academic journals, but also in the press.  Regardless of Juliá’s recent statements, the 
long-running historical controversy about the concept of “two Spains” is clearly continuing in 
the political sphere.  This controversy will be partially addressed by considering next the 
historiographical highlights of literature regarding the “two Spains” and its relation to the 
aftermath of 11-M. 
Santos Juliá’s book, Historia de las dos Españas, published in 2004 is one of the major 
studies on the concept of “two Spains.”106  Juliá said that Spain has two sectors: one is 
conservative, reactionary, and opposed to any change that would in the slightest way transform 
the nation; the other is reformist, progressive, and eager to engage in change.  He acknowledged 
that many other countries are also split this way, but he argued that Spain is exceptional in this 
regard, mostly because of the role of the Catholic Church in the state.  He supported his 
argument by mentioning Article 12 of the first (1812) Spanish constitution.  This article stated 
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“the religion of the Spanish nation is and will forever be Catholic, Apostolic and Roman, the 
only true religion.”107  The Spanish constitution of 1876, which restored the monarchy, has 
similar language, but this language was eliminated by the Second Republic constitution of 1931 
and the current 1978 constitution separated church and state.  Juliá also referenced a speech by 
Cardinal Antonio Maria Rouco Varela, the Archbishop of Madrid, who linked Spanish identity 
to the Catholic religion.  Another of Juliá’s arguments was that Spain suffered a huge departure 
of intellectuals following the Civil War, which only began to be replaced in the next generation 
and which further strengthened the hand of the Catholic Church during the Franco regime.  A 
summary of Juliá’s arguments are the key issues in Spain are national identity and exclusive 
nationalism and that the concept of “two Spains” is a bipolar metaphor for reality. 
In addition to his academic work, Juliá is a political columnist for El País, the leading 
left-leaning newspaper in Spain.  At the one year anniversary of 11-M, he wrote an article about 
the reaction of the PP to the attacks.
108
  He stated that the purpose of Aznar’s first speech after 
the PP defeat in the election of March 14 was to erode and undermine the legitimacy of the 
Socialist win.  In the words of Juliá: “Their purpose is evident: eroding, undermining the 
legitimacy of the triumph of the Socialists in those [past] elections.”109  He continued by arguing 
that the PP leaders had a strategy to cast doubt on the perpetrators of 11-M by alleging that there 
was a conspiracy involving a collusion between the Socialists and ETA with the terrorists so that 
the Socialists would win the election.  Juliá additionally noted that as an opposition party, PP had 
failed to offer a single idea about what to do in the new situation following 11-M. 
Sebastiaan Faber has authored many relatively recent research publications about 
memory related to the Spanish Civil War.  One of his papers, “The Debate about Spain’s Past 
and the Crisis of Academic Legitimacy: The Case of Juliá Santos,” discussed the concept of “two 
Spains.”110  Faber argued that because of the highly polarized rhetoric in Spain, the concept of 
“two Spains” was still active.  He also labeled the concept as the “Spanish problem” because 
opinion leaders continued to “view the Spanish nation metaphorically as a collective body 
                                                 
107
 “Consitución Política de la Monarquía Española promulgada en Cádiz a 19 de marzo de 1812,” Capítulo 2, 
Artículo 12.  Translated by me.  Original line in Spanish: “la religión de la nación española es y será perpetuamente 
la católica apostólica y romana, única religión verdadera.” 
108
 Santos Juliá, “Un año de oposición,” El País, May 1, 2005. 
109
 Juliá, “Un año de oposición.”; Translation by me. Original text: “Su propósito es evidente: erosionar, socavar la 
legitimidad del triunfo de los socialistas en aquellas elecciones.” 
110
 Faber, “The Debate about Spain’s Past,” 165-190. 
30 
 
suffering from some physical or psychological ailment.”111  He supported his argument by 
mentioning the caustic duel between the PP and PSOE political parties, the loss of rationality, the 
lack of mutual respect in public discourse.  On the other hand, Faber praised the openness of idea 
creation.  Additionally, he lamented the polarization of the media, which has negatively impacted 
independent journalism.  Faber summarized the bipolar nature of Spain by stating: “Still, the 
Spanish crisis seems particularly severe, and its symptoms particularly pronounced.  Another 
trait that distinguishes the polarizing process in Spain from that of the rest in the West is the fact 
that Spain’s political discourse is strangely haunted by history, and seemingly prone to an 
obsessive rehearsal of past conflicts.”112 
Nicholas Manganas has presented las dos Españas (liberal and conservative Spains) as a 
prevalent social narrative in Spain.
113
  Manganas described “liberal” Spain as having been 
“accorded the values of the French Revolution” and as being “anti-monarchical and anti-
regionalist.”114  He said that in the popular historical narrative, the cause of the Spanish Civil 
War was the deep difference in the two ideologies of las dos Españas.  The popular narrative 
continues by generalizing the Franco regime as having been the height of “conservative” Spain 
and that it was the second point of following traditionalist precepts, which proved to be 
“illegitimate, oppressive, and undemocratic.”  Manganas argued that although the narrative 
assumes that every Spaniard can be placed on one side or the other, the narrative is potent and 
real to the families who lost relatives in the Civil War.  According to Manganas, one social 
narrative from the Franco regime that continues to the present time is the claim that the regime 
“was restoring ‘order’ to Spain after the chaos that ensued with the liberal Second Republic.  
Liberal Spain was thus accorded the values of ‘disorder’ – a narrative that has remained 
dominant to this day in much of the Spanish mass media.”115  He additionally argued that the 
“pact of silence” diminished the concept of las dos Españas with the idea that Spain was a 
peaceful and democratic nation.  Then following 11-M, Manganas suggested that the narrative of 
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las dos Españas returned.
116
  He concluded by maintaining that this narrative is entrenched in 
Spanish memory because of previous social terror.
117
 
Controversies 
As the analysis of the immediate aftermath timeline of 11-M and historiography indicate, 
the security crisis following the national trauma of the attacks was politicized.  Consequently, 
several controversies developed out of the aftermath of 11-M, some of which continue to today.  
This section explores the following major controversies: 
 What caused the 2004 election outcome of an unexpected PSOE win?  Was it the 
terrorism attack or was it the government response to the attack? 
 Were the protests after the 11-M attack an emotional reaction or were they 
politically motivated? 
 Why was ETA blamed for the attack?  Who were the perpetrators? 
 What were the motives behind the terrorist attack? 
This section also discusses in what way and to what extent conspiracy theories shaped the 
discourse on the 11-M attack.  These controversies and conspiracy theories were cultivated by 
the differing reports between the government and the investigation teams as well as the 
conflicting reports within the media over the responsibilities behind the attacks.  There also was 
not a clear motivation for the attackers, whoever they were, and thus led to rumors of a 
government cover-up.  The first major controversy which will be explored is that of the outcome 
of the election. 
Election Outcome 
 Following the 11-M attack, the election turned against the incumbent Partido Popular 
party and their leftist rivals won the election.  But was it the terrorist attack that caused the PSOE 
to win the election or was it the government response to the attack that caused the PP to lose the 
election?  This had been a major talking point for politicians and political commentators as well 
as the ordinary Spanish people in the decade following the Atocha attack.  Most people tend to 
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agree that the political demise of Aznar’s party (Partido Popular, PP) was not due to the attack 
itself but was due to the response the government had to it.
118
  The “fixation” of the Interior 
Minister, Acebes, about ETA’s responsibility for the attacks was because the party knew that 
people would rally behind them in the face of an attack by ETA but would criticize them for their 
policies in Iraq if it turned out to be an attack from an Arab source.  As an outcome of the 
Socialist victory, Zapatero had a massive responsibility put on his shoulders and he needed to 
overcome the blunderings of the PP and the past problems within the Socialist party during his 
leadership.
119
  Zapatero certainly shouldered the responsibility when he took Spanish troops out 
of Iraq.  This sentiment was also echoed in American observations after the attack took place.   
A Senior Fellow of U.S. Foreign Policy, Philip H. Gordon, observed in his testimony to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in late March of 2004 about the attack that “there 
can be little doubt that the March 11 attacks influenced the outcome of the election” as the polls 
showed a clear victory by the PP the week before the election.  Gordon continued in his 
testimony that “the Aznar government appears to have concluded that an ETA attack would be 
politically helpful… whereas an al Qaeda attack might hurt the government…”120 
 Victor de la Serna contrasted the electoral effects of the 2004 Madrid bombings and the 
effects of the 2005 London attacks on U.K. politics.  The events in Madrid caused “three 
venomous days of recriminations about the terrorist actions and their perpetrators” and the 
favorable lead the incumbents had (despite the overwhelming opposition to the Iraq War) 
evaporated.
121
  In contrast, the government in the U.K. did not experience upheaval as they were 
not facing an impending election.  As de la Serna concluded, the political infighting in Spain 
“poisoned” the political atmosphere and provoked an ever-widening social divide between the 
left and the right which led to the vanishing of the “horror” of 11-M in the few years after the 
event.
122
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 This divide between the political parties also spread into a divide between media outlets 
and a disconnection between the government and the press.  In the hours and days following the 
attacks, the press headlines changed depending on the information available to change the 
framing of the attack from one of domestic terror to that of international extremism.
123
  The 
change in blame can be seen primarily in the leftist and international coverage of the attack as 
well as the changes in the government response to the attack.  The first few hours after the attack 
saw overwhelming support for the blaming of ETA (even the Basque nationalist party joined in 
the blame) and this belief in the perpetrators of the attack was reinforced by the news conference 
held at 1:00 PM on the 11
th
 of March by the Minister of the Interior confirming that ETA was 
suspected of carrying out the attack.
124
  In the days that followed, the press began to have 
different viewpoints on the attacks and the perpetrators.  The authenticity of the government’s 
blame for the attack was called into question by leftist newspapers/organizations such as El País 
when, at the same time, the rightist news organizations (such as El Mundo) generally backed the 
governmental response and accused the left of “manipulating by distorting facts.”125  As 
questions arose around whether or not Aznar’s government was telling the truth, protestors 
demonstrated across Spain in the days leading up to the election. 
 However, other sources have cited the overwhelming majority of Spaniards who opposed 
the Iraq invasion as the main reason that the PP lost the 2004 election.  For example, a March of 
2003 poll of Spaniards showed that as many as ninety-two percent of Spaniards opposed the war 
in Iraq.  This included seventy-one percent of those who had voted for the PP but were against 
involvement in the war.
126
  Tony Karon of Time Magazine argued that the outcome of the 
election, had it been held a year before, might have had a similar result as around ninety percent 
of voters opposed the support for the war and that the attacks “simply put the Iraq issue back at 
center stage.”127  In this view, the bombings did not change the existing opinion of the Spanish 
voters on the issue of the involvement in Iraq but it spurred them to the voting booths to express 
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their views and to elect new leaders who would see them leave Iraq.
128
  The political change 
following 11-M deepened the divide between the two political parties and created a more 
negative atmosphere in the political and public spheres and led to parliamentary inquiries.  These 
inquiries were not only focused on the attackers but also on the performance of the cabinet 
during the time of the attack for not having “prepared better for Islamic terrorist actions” and for 
misleading the public on who to blame for the attack.
129
 
The desire to change the leadership of the country as the driving force for the PP defeat 
was echoed in other articles by journalists and historians.  One argument was the increasing 
support for the PSOE following the official start of campaign.  Raj S. Chari discussed the two 
major reasons for the rise of the Socialists as being restructuring of a “new ‘generation’ of 
socialists” as a way to distance the party from the corrupt Socialist politicians of the past and the 
development of policies to help poor or younger Spanish citizens who had historically had issues 
in entering the property market, as well as policies promising greater European integration and 
the removal of troops from Iraq.
130
  These shifts in policy along with the missteps of the PP prior 
to the start of the elections and before the Madrid train bombings led to some observations of 
how the Socialists won the election.  However, the polls do not support this argument. 
There are other historians who have argued that it was a combination of factors which led 
to the downfall of the PP and the rise of the PSOE in the election.  There are three factors which 
this group of historians predominantly point to as the reason for the shift in the direction of the 
public’s vote.  The first was the continued insistence that ETA was behind the attack even after 
confirmation by the leadership that an Islamic group was behind the attack.  The second was the 
public’s mistrust of the party which had been building even before the attack occurred.  The third 
was the resurgence of antiwar views as many saw the attacks as punishment for the involvement 
in Iraq.
131
  There is another argument which furthers the multi-causality of the election results as 
based off of emotional responses by the electorate towards the attack and the government’s 
response. 
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On April 23, 2004, Spanish troops withdrew from their international brigade in Iraq and 
headed home.  Zapatero had completed his campaign promise to get Spanish troops out of Iraq.  
Though he had removed the Spanish forces from combat, Zapatero was still committed to 
fighting terrorism.  In a September 21, 2004, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he 
thanked the other member nations for their support following the 11-M bombings and stated that 
“nothing justifies terrorism” and that “terrorism is insanity and death and, regrettably, there will 
always be fanatics who are ready to kill to impose their insanity through force.”132  He continued 
by discussing terrorism as the “seed of evil,” a seed that could not take root in a society of 
“justice, well-being, freedom and hope” but could only take root “if it lands on the soil of 
injustice, poverty, humiliation, and despair.”133  He also addressed the reasons for removing 
Spain from the war.  He stated that the majority of Spaniards who were against the war “were not 
persuaded by the reasons given by those who promoted the war.”  Zapatero also stated that 
“winning the war would be much easier than winning the peace” and that Spain would contribute 
to the restoration of full sovereignty and independence of a democratic Iraq.
134
 As such, he 
contrasted his government to that of Aznar’s and the desire to no longer have troops in Iraq to 
begin the rebuilding process of the Iraqi government.  It was with this mentality, at least 
publicly, and the pressure of the Spanish people to leave the war that caused Spain to no longer 
be a member of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Therefore, it can be said that the 11-M terrorists 
achieved one of their major objectives, although Zapatero was also meeting his pre-election 
promise. 
Election results for the 2004 general election for the Congress of Deputies when 
compared to the 2000 election are indicative of what transpired following 11-M.  PSOE gained 
3.1 million more votes and PP lost 550,000 votes versus the 2000 election.  All other parties 
gained 120,000 votes with most of the gain by the regional parties: the Catalonia Republican Left 
(ERC) and the Basque National Party (PNV).  Overall, the voter turnout increased by 2.67 
million voters which nearly matches the PSOE increase.  The overall voter turnout was 75.7%, 
which was 6.9% points greater than in 2000.
135
  Clearly, the PSOE won because of the greater 
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voter turnout and not because the PP had a vote reduction of 550,000 votes.  Therefore, the 
question becomes what motivated the greater than expected voter turnout?  Was it fear that 
caused the overturning of the PP government? 
Protestors’ Motivation 
As was noted in the 11-M aftermath timeline, demonstrators took to the streets of most 
cities in Spain in the period between the bombings and the election.  The first demonstrations of 
March 12 were initially called by the PP government to rally support and to express indignation 
for the terrorist attack.  The turnout on March 12 was massive with about twenty-five percent of 
the population of Spain demonstrating, which would be the equivalent of about eighty million 
people in the United States.  This initial, incredible turnout was generally in support of the 
government, but rumors had begun that maybe the terrorists were not ETA and some 
demonstrators began questioning the government narrative, especially in Madrid and Barcelona.  
Giles Tremlett, who was in Madrid the night of March 12, stated that over a million people 
packed the streets during a steady rain and that the crowds became increasingly angry as the 
demonstration progressed.  The anger, which was initially against ETA, became more directed at 
the government with anti-war signs and ringing cries of “Who was it?”136  Continuing large 
demonstrations on March 13 and March 14 were not called by the government and these 
demonstrations were questioning the government’s veracity.  Many of these demonstrations 
targeted PP offices. 
Tremlett attended the March 13 demonstrations at the PP’s Génova Street Headquarters 
in Madrid.  He said that when he arrived at ten minutes to six, there were only a handful of 
demonstrators and more than a dozen journalists and photographers present.  At precisely six, the 
demonstration “materialised out of thin air” with hundreds, then thousands of people arriving.  
Within thirty minutes, 5,000 people were present angrily shouting “We want the truth, before we 
vote” along with continued cries of “Who was it?”  The demonstration continued throughout the 
night into Election Day.  Tremlett stated: “There was no silence.  The crowd howled… It was 
remarkable, given the tension and the anger, that there was no violence.”137  What motivated 
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such large demonstrations in Spain in the immediate aftermath of 11-M?  Why did the PP lose 
the election? 
Many say that the initial reaction to a terrorist attack is fear.  Others say that the reaction 
is anger.  Olmeda discussed a “causal path” in the aftermath of 11-M that resulted in the PSOE 
electoral victory.  He suggested:  
The main effect is fear; this is the climate for blaming the government instead of blaming 
the terrorist.  As we have seen before, the period of the PP government with an overall 
majority brought an increased polarisation of the electorate.  In this milieu, the terrorist 
attacks were the necessary condition for an increasing turnout (a result of the attacks plus 
the demonstrations on March 12); for a transformation of the expressive vote for the post-
communists into a [sic] instrumental vote for the socialists, an increase of the ‘useful’ 
vote, especially in the sectors mobilized by the flash mobs and for the constitution of the 
populist antiwar frame in the master frame to attract younger, new voters nurtured by the 
cycle of protest against the PP and its policies in different sectors.
138
 
Manganas likewise attributed the reaction to 11-M as fear.  Regarding the period between the 
attack and the election, he stated: “Those three days constituted a unique form of social terror 
unleashed upon the Spanish people.”  Furthermore, he stated that the PP government endeavored 
to “turn a moment of fear into one of political gain by using a particular narrative that 
backfired.”139  He was referring to the “blame ETA” narrative.  Additionally Manganas 
discussed that the media’s narratives in the aftermath of 11-M were not neutral and that the 
narratives had an effect on their audiences.
140
  The aftermath timeline presented in the beginning 
of this section strongly supports the media influence particularly with radio station Cadena Ser 
broadcasts and with editorials in the two major newspapers El País and El Mundo.  Manganas 
summarizes with a general statement about the historical record: “The accepted narratives in the 
aftermath of the 11 March attacks is that the PP government was voted out of government 
because it ‘manipulated’ the flow of information by insisting that ETA was responsible.”141 
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Philip H. Gordon, a U.S. foreign policy expert, testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on March 31, 2004, about the Madrid bombings and the setback caused by the 
defeat of Spain’s Popular Party.  He was adamant in his testimony that any conclusion that Spain 
had opted for appeasement with terrorism by withdrawing from Iraq was misplaced and he 
warned that wrong policy decisions could give the terrorists what they wanted, which was to 
undermine cooperation.  Gordon provided details to support his belief that Spanish voters did not 
give in to terrorism.  In particular, he mentioned poll data.  He said that polls of March 7, the 
final polls before the election, indicated that the PSOE trailed the PP thirty-eight percent to forty-
two percent.  He said it was not likely that the PSOE could have turned around opinion within a 
week to win forty-four percent to thirty-eight percent were it not for the attacks.  He stressed that 
voter turnout of Spain’s thirty-five million voters rose to seventy-seven percent, compared to just 
fifty-five percent four years earlier, and that two million of the new voters were first-time voters.  
He attributed the voter turnout to a strong emotional response, some of which was opposition to 
the Iraq war, but mainly he said it was anger at the government’s handling of the 11-M crisis.  
He presented polling data taken after the election which found that at least sixty-seven percent of 
the Spanish people believed that the government had manipulated information.  He further stated 
that the historical stand of both Spanish parties against terrorism was a convincing argument that 
appeasement was highly unlikely.
142
 
Woodworth had a different perspective on the PP government reaction to the 11-M 
attacks.  He believed that Aznar’s fixation on ETA blame for the attack was probably a 
calculated strategy.  Aznar was counting on the Spanish people rallying behind the government 
for an ETA attack as the people had done previously.  However, if the attack was Al Qaeda 
related, Aznar was likely thinking that the PP would be punished in the election due to his 
government’s participation in the Iraq war, which was opposed by ninety-two percent of the 
Spanish people, including seventy-one percent of PP voters.
143
  Regarding the demonstrations the 
evening of March 12, Woodworth stated: “With Friday night’s enormous demonstrations, the 
government found that rage against its handling of information about the bombings was palpable.  
People were not demonstrating against ETA, they were chanting, ‘Who was it?’ and ‘Your war, 
our blood!’  Among the thousands of messages left at the bombing sites and at town halls, many 
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blamed Aznar personally for the attacks.”  Woodworth also mentioned a London Times interview 
of Aznar in April 2004 in which Aznar said “that it was an ‘infamy’ to suggest that he had 
played politics with terrorism.”144  Woodworth had several conclusions about the 11-M 
aftermath, which he termed as being positive.  His first conclusion was about the maturity of the 
Spanish people, who responded quickly to a rapidly changing political situation.  He stated: 
“Those who say Spaniards voted out of fear simply do not know Spanish democracy, which has 
not been intimidated by 30 years of bombings and shootings by ETA.”  Secondly he 
acknowledged that the Spanish police and intelligence services conducted a professional 
investigation of the 11-M bombings, quickly tracked down the likely bombers, and avoided 
being misled by the government.
145
  One could say that their findings changed the election.  
Woolworth also summarized the ETA situation by predicting that ETA was likely to announce a 
cease-fire because the “Madrid bombings have shattered most of whatever support remained for 
‘armed struggle’.”146 
The above examples of 11-M historiography debated about whether fear or anger caused 
the large demonstrations following the 11-M attacks and the high voter turnout are inconclusive.  
A broader examination may be enlightening.  Terrorism expert Max Abrahms has looked into the 
Madrid bombings to determine if the outcome of this attack was an anomaly, because the 
terrorists achieved their objective of forcing the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.  
Abrahms has shown that terrorists rarely achieve their objective when targeting civilians.  He has 
said that normally the exact opposite occurs since the usual response is for the attacked nation to 
go on the offensive and not make concessions, with the electorate moving to the political right.
147
  
As the previously presented timeline indicates, this typical response occurred for less than one 
day following 11-M; then the election tilted to the political left.  However, Spain followed the 
norm in response to ETA attacks.  During Aznar’s two terms as President of the Government, 
most Spaniards supported his policy of “zero tolerance” for ETA attacks.  This policy was so 
effective that by the end of his administration, ETA membership had dropped below a hundred.  
Therefore, what interrupted the normal response following 11-M?  According to the Abrahms’ 
model, the PP should have won the election. 
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Sidney Tarrow, in his book Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics, presented how social movements generate political power through contentious 
collective action and political opportunity.  He argued that contentious collective action is the 
basis for social movements, protests, riots, strike waves, and insurgencies; and that actions may 
be brief or sustained.  Contentious collective action can bestow power on ordinary people by 
challenging authorities in conflicted ways.
148
  Additionally, he argued that political opportunity 
is a necessary condition for contentious politics to arise and that opportunities must be available 
for mobilization and exploitation through structures and networks.  He summarized by stating: 
“People engage in contentious politics when patterns of political opportunities and constraints 
change, and then by strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, creating new 
opportunities, which are used by others in a widening cycle of contention.”149 
To answer why the Spanish electorate tilted to the political left in a few days, the Tarrow 
arguments may have utility.  To determine if the arguments apply, the questions of whether or 
not the demonstrations became contentious and were organized to become collective and 
whether or not political opportunity existed are key.  Tremlett was a witness to the Madrid 
demonstrations and he said that the government called demonstration of March 12 became 
increasingly angry as the evening progressed.  Tremlett also said that the demonstrations in 
regional areas “already angry with Aznar,” particularly Barcelona and Bilbao, were especially 
tense.
150
  Olmeda stated that at the Barcelona demonstration, several PP politicians were 
attacked.
151
  Tremlett likewise said that the Madrid demonstrations of March 13 and 14, which 
followed the rumors, newspaper, editorials, and radio broadcast of potential Al Qaeda 
involvement were tense with loud and angry crowds.
152
  Olmeda described the demonstrations of 
March 13 and 14 as being “micro-mobilisations (flash mobs).”153  Based on the Tremlett and 
Olmeda reports, the demonstrations became contentious, but were they organized to become 
collective? 
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Olmeda named several organizations and internet sites of different ideologies involved in 
the mobilization of the “flash mob” demonstrations.  He asserted that activists at these 
networking organizations planned the demonstrations of March 13 and 14 through messages on 
their sites and through cell phone text messaging.
154
  Likewise, Tremlett mentioned the use of 
cell phone text messaging to organize the demonstrations, which he labeled as a new political 
phenomenon, “the instant text message demonstration.”  He said that his partner’s cell phone 
received this message: “Aznar smelling of roses?  They call this the day of reflection and Urdaci 
is working?  Today, the 13
th
, at 6 p.m., PP HQ 13 Génova St., without parties.  Silence for the 
truth.  pásalo!”  Tremlett explained that Urdaci was the head of news at the state broadcaster 
RTVE.  He also explained that pásalo means “pass it on” in English.  He said that these chain 
text messages became known as “pásalo messages.”  In a few hours, demonstrations were 
arranged at PP offices throughout the country.
155
  Jill Robbins published similar information 
about how the demonstrations were organized through emails and texting.  She said the “protests 
demonstrated the existence of a politicized populace with a sophisticated sense of the workings 
of language, technology, and the media image, resistant to political commonplaces, and 
suspicious of government’s motives.”  Robbins observed that the network society and the media 
had quickly unraveled the government’s narrative about blaming ETA and that the PP’s loss of 
message was a major factor in their election defeat.
156
  Therefore the demonstrations were 
organized and hence collective, but was political opportunity present? 
Initially, the 11-M attacks provided political opportunity for the PP, since the norm, 
according to Abrahms, was for the population to rally around the government.  As the aftermath 
timeline event analysis reflects, within three hours of the attack, Aznar was already moving to 
take advantage of the situation by calling for support demonstrations on March 12 under a 
politically charged banner headline of “With the victims, with the Constitution, for defeating 
terrorism,” which resulted in at least the Catalan prime minister objecting to including the 
controversial Constitution of 1978 in the slogan.  However, as the government story of ETA 
responsibility began to unravel, the Opposition began to take advantage of the situation.  
According to the aftermath timeline, by the morning of March 12, Zapatero was raising the 
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question of potential Al Qaeda involvement and when the PSOE issued their final statement 
before Election Day, they accused the government of lying.  In the same statement, the PSOE 
denied organizing the demonstrations.  Hence, the PP government and the Opposition saw 
political opportunity in the aftermath of 11-M related to the election.  What is astounding is how 
the opportunity swung from the PP government to the Opposition within two days as the PP 
government mishandled their response to 11-M. 
An assessment of psychological distress in the general Madrid population was conducted 
by Juan J. Miguel-Tobal et al in the period of one to three months following the 11-M attacks.
157
  
The study was carefully structured to be fully representative of the Madrid population and to 
oversample the population who lived within one kilometer of the bombings areas.
158
  The study 
found that only 2.3 percent of the Madrid population suffered post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) related to the bombings.  Higher PTSD rates were found in people who were directly 
exposed to the bombings: direct witness – 8.3 percent PTSD rate, friend or relative killed – 6.1 
percent, rescue involvement – 3.6 percent.  The study also found that 11.7 percent of the 
respondents suffered symptoms of panic attack during or soon after the bombings, which 
indicated that a relatively small proportion of the Madrid population was seriously stressed and 
fearful following 11-M.
159
 
Research by Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner supports the argument that anger caused 
the large demonstrations following 11-M.  They found that fear and anger have opposite effects 
on risk perception, judgement, and actions.  Fearful people are risk adverse and make decisions 
based on pessimism; whereas angry people are risk seeking and make decisions based on 
optimism.  Surprisingly, angry people are similar to happy people in risk taking.  Hence, fearful 
people were not likely to have participated in the widespread demonstrations, but angry people 
would have been driven to take action.
160
 
In summary, all facets of Tarrow’s theories about contentious collective action and 
political opportunity were present in the immediate aftermath of 11-M.  The social movement 
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swung the election to the political left because of the turnout of new voters, who were motivated 
by the media and social messaging about the government not telling the truth.  Was it fear or 
anger that drove the demonstrations and social movement?  Tremlett was a witness and he saw 
anger.  Woodworth had a strong point in his statement that the Spanish people had not been 
intimidated by thirty years of ETA terrorism and had not voted out of fear.  Also the meaning of 
“contentious” as being argumentative, especially heated or impassioned, generally implies the 
presence of anger.  The data from the Miguel-Tobal et al psychological study indicated that at 
least eighty-eight percent of the Madrid population did not have a serious fear response to 11-M.  
Furthermore, the study found that nearly half of the PTSD reported symptoms were among 
people with low social support, who were less likely to have participated in the 
demonstrations.
161
  Finally, the Lerner and Keltner research confirmed that generally fearful 
people are risk adverse and were not likely to have participated in the demonstrations.  Therefore 
it is reasonable to conclude that anger against the terrorists and against the government and not 
fear was the motivating factor for the demonstrations and social movement which drove the 
greater voter turnout. 
The Perpetrators  
As evident in the delay between the government blaming the attack on ETA and the 
subsequent shift to put blame on international Islamist extremism, differences in opinion on who 
conducted the attack were debated for over a decade after the attacks’ conclusion and into the 
present time.  There are conspiracy theories that the attack was a cover-up from both the left and 
the right in the press and in politics.  But just who conducted the attacks on 11-M?  This section 
looks at the differing opinions over who conducted the train bombings. 
 The majority of historians as well as leftist politicians and press place the responsibility 
for the attack on Islamist extremists who had outside support from terrorist organizations, as 
evident from the police reports in the days and months following the attack.  However, there still 
is disagreement within this camp as to whether or not the terrorists were “homegrown” or 
whether they had ties to the central Al Qaeda leadership.  Some news articles labeled the 
terrorists as “…inspired by al-Qaeda’s call to reconquer the lands which were once Islamic…” 
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but that there were “relatively few signs of any direct contact or training” from the main 
leadership of Al Qaeda.
162
  However, there are also articles which detail the terrorists as having 
direct ties to Al Qaeda leadership primarily through Abu Musab al Zarqawi as he was potentially 
the mastermind for the attack.
163
  One of the historians who believes that the terrorist network 
responsible for 11-M had international connections is Fernando Reinares, who is considered a 
Spanish terrorism expert and has published extensively on the network and the leaders who 
targeted Spain. 
In 2009, Reinares examined the bombings by providing an analysis of the terrorist 
network involved and the process of radicalization among the members of the network.  He 
argued that analyzing the network helped to provide a “deeper understanding of terrorist 
radicalization” and that the people responsible for the train bombings were radicalized at 
different times, in different places, and through different means.
164
  He concluded that the 
network was not “homegrown” and that, “with one exception,” had international connections and 
did not include people from Spain or Western Europe.
165
  He also concluded that the makeup of 
the group included those who radicalized before 9/11; after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, 
and after the US-led invasion of Iraq.
166
  In 2010, he published an article which tied a Moroccan, 
Amer Azizi, to central Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan.  Reinares was quoted as saying “There was 
always speculation that Azizi was the instigator of the attack.  Amer Azizi’s name appears in 149 
of the 271 volumes on the Madrid bombings compiled by Spain’s National Court.”167 
In a 2012 article Reinares explored the role Al Qaeda played in the attack and the likely 
connection between the central leadership of Al Qaeda and the Madrid network.  He showed that 
Azizi initiated plans for an attack as early as the second half of 2001 and traveled from Pakistan 
to Spain in 2003 to convey the approval of Al Qaeda for an attack on Spain.
168
  He concluded 
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that this connection showed that the “decision to attack Spain and the mobilization of a terrorist 
network to accomplish this objective were top down processes.”169  In a 2014 book, Reinares 
went into greater detail over the reasoning behind the targeting of Spain for the attack.  He 
examined the train bombings and determined why Spain might have been targeted by the 
extremists.  He argued, similarly to his other works, that Azizi was the man who was most 
interested in attacking Spain and that he was considering an attack on Spain as early as the 
autumn of 2001, before 9/11.
170
  Indeed, Reinares concluded that Azizi was the terrorist mainly 
responsible for the attack and that the Iraq War was not a driving force behind the attack, but 
provided a “favorable context to suit his [Azizi’s] strategy and to leverage an impact.”171  It was 
this grouping of arguments and conclusions by Reinares which differed from much of 11-M 
historiography, which saw the terrorist cell responsible for the train bombings as leaderless with 
homegrown motives. 
 However, regardless of whether or not the terrorists were aligned with the central 
leadership of Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization was not shy from showing its support of the 
attacks.  A video by the terrorist group, released in 2007, featured the American-turned-Islamist 
extremist Adam Gadhan praising the destruction wrought by terrorists in the previous six years.  
He expressed how “proud” Al Qaeda was of the destruction in Madrid and London, as well as 
that of New York and Washington.
172
 
Immediately following the attack, the Aznar government and the opposition were quick 
to put the blame on ETA for carrying out the attack.  This was evident in Aznar’s press 
conference on the day of the attack in which he strongly implicated that ETA was behind the 
bombings and that, in effect, the strength of the law and the unity of Spaniards would put an end 
to the terrorists.
173
  Along with this statement, the PP attempted to get a U.N. resolution passed to 
condemn ETA for the attacks.  Spanish diplomats were successful in doing so and, thus, a 
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resolution was quickly passed by a supportive U.N., but which would eventually become a focus 
of criticism among Spaniards and the international community.
174
 
 Although the evidence that emerged from the police investigation seemed to 
overwhelmingly prove that Islamist terrorists were behind the attack, the ousted PP officials as 
well as right-wing news organizations continued to imply (even over a decade later) that ETA 
was behind the attack.  They sought to show to their supporters, and to the left-wing politicians 
and the Socialists’ supporters, that there had been a cover up by the opposition.  There were a 
series of reports published in El Mundo placing the blame on ETA, on the Socialists themselves, 
and even on the police.  One such conspiracy theory alleged that “Spanish intelligence officials, 
who were partial to the Socialists, allowed the train bombings to happen to help pave the way for 
the Socialists to take government” in the March elections.175  Even Aznar believed that this could 
have been a possibility, as he mentioned that he believed that the attacks would still have 
occurred even if he had changed the election date to a week earlier.
176
  Another conspiracy 
placed blame on the police for planting evidence.  Foreign affairs spokesman for the PP, Gustavo 
de Arístegui, stated two days after the attack that “Certain opposition parties are trying to use Al 
Qaeda because of the Iraq war simply to win an election… I think it’s repulsive.”  He also stated, 
in reference to the Koranic tape discovered in the van, that “I cannot picture a radical Islamist 
with a beginner’s tape.  Normally it would be someone with more sophisticated material.  
Anybody could have planted a tape there.”177  These conspiracy theories either reflect true 
disbelief in the police investigation or they are a fabrication to sway public opinion about the 
election outcome and the sudden unexpected defeat.   
 In late 2004 into early 2005, a parliamentary panel which investigated the train bombings 
took aim at the government’s response to the attack.  During a portion of testimony to the panel, 
Aznar implicitly stated his support for the allegation that ETA was the behind the attack.  He said 
“there is absolute proof that shows… a connection between Eta [sic] terrorists and Islamic 
terrorism” as well as “what is strange to me is that there is no will to investigate it.  I am one of 
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those who believe that all (forms of) terrorism end up being connected.”178  Zapatero also was 
called to testify in front of the parliamentary commission.  During his testimony, Zapatero 
claimed that all computer records of Aznar and his office between March 11 and March 14 had 
been wiped.  Zapatero accused Aznar of attempting to fool Spaniards into believing ETA was at 
fault and of “massive deceit.”179  Ultimately, the members of the investigative panel disagreed 
with Aznar’s “absolute proof” of ETA involvement.  They concluded that the former government 
of Aznar “manipulated and twisted” information about the blasts and that ETA “had played no 
role in the blasts.”180  However, this did not quell the conspiracy theories on the right regarding 
the blame for the attack. 
 As evident by the conspiracy theories being perpetuated by the right regarding the 
attacks, they have had the effect of sowing doubt into the narrative of who perpetrated the 
attacks.  Manganas concluded that the main conspiracy narrative was only to do this, but to also 
insist that the attack was the sole reason for the defeat of the PP.  His description of the main 
narrative in the conspiracy theory shared many similarities to other out of the realm of 
possibilities that most conspiracy theories contain: 
The conspiracy theory reads something like this: that the March 11 attacks were mounted 
by remote control by some Spanish political groups with Moroccan and French agents 
and executed by Basque terrorists and al-Qaeda working side by side with the blessing of 
the Spanish left and some news media.
181
 
With both sides creating narratives of the attack, the duality of Spain has continued to widen and 
divide Spain. 
A 2007 trial which convicted twenty-one out of twenty-eight on charges of terrorism 
showed that the conspiracy theories had not been disproven well enough for some politicians.  
Politicians on both sides accused each other of “playing politics with the tragedy” even with the 
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judge going out of his way to tell the media and those present at the trial that “there was no 
evidence to support what has become an enduring conspiracy theory in Spain.”182  The trial’s 
verdict happened to also be pronounced on the same day that another major event in modern 
Spanish memory politics occurred: the final version of the 2007 Law of Historical Memory was 
approved by Parliament.
183
  However, both the trial and the law did not completely remove the 
political controversies over either event. 
Considering the trial outcome of Islamist terrorists being responsible for the attack, there 
have been articles published which refute the evidence to “prove” that the official narrative was 
false.  One such article, published in 2009, argued that the evidence which confirmed the theory 
of an Islamist attack “can not [sic] stand up to rigorous analysis” and that “suspicious behavior of 
certain elements of the police forces clearly indicates the existence of an intent to sabotage the 
investigation.”184  This biased account of the evidence and how the police supposedly tampered 
with the evidence was enlightening on some of the arguments utilized by conspiracy theorists to 
explain how the government/police were behind the attacks.  Though the article does not 
explicitly state who was behind the attack, it does place blame of evidence inconsistencies 
squarely on the shoulders of police who were also to blame for “falsification of testimony.”185 
Based particularly on the 11-M trial outcome, the extensive research by Reinares, the 
claims by the terrorists themselves, and the consensus by most researchers, one must conclude 
that Islamists conducted the Madrid train attacks and that they were likely connected to Al Qaeda 
in some fashion.  Indeed, an Al Qaeda related group, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade (considered 
a cell under the Abu Nayaf al-Afghani group) claimed responsibility for the attack.  In contrast, 
the claims by Aznar and the PP that the terrorists were the ETA must be refuted.  Why the 
terrorists attacked Spain is addressed next. 
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Terrorists’ Motivation 
 One of the main controversies over the attack is the question of what motivated the 
terrorists to attack Spain. Some of the major possible reasons which have been cited were the 
presence of Spanish troops in Iraq, Spain being the “weakest” of the major allies in Iraq, creation 
of fear, and the desire for the return of Al-Andalus. 
 Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the three main countries 
diplomatically driving the allied coalition in Iraq.  Of those three, terrorist masterminds 
determined through analysis that Spain was the weakest and the easiest for targeting and 
manipulation.
186
  Along with this, the terrorists recognized the instability that could be achieved 
prior to the upcoming election.  They saw the election as a “lever that, if pressed correctly, could 
help achieve their aims: to destabilize ‘the coalition of the willing’ and force a big army to 
abandon Iraq.”187  This coincided with the central Al Qaeda leadership calling for an attack on 
the West.  As Osama bin Laden was quoted as saying in October of 2003, Al Qaeda “reserved 
the right to respond at the opportune moment and place against all of the countries participating 
in this unjust war, in particular: Great Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.”188  
Spain also had historical significance as part of the master plan for Al Qaeda.  Part of the major 
global plan of Al Qaeda is the re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate of the Middle Ages, 
which includes Spain itself.
189
 
 Along with the instability of the Spanish participation in Iraq, historians Patricia 
Bezunartea, José Manuel López, and Laura Tedesco argued that there were several other reasons 
for Spain being targeted by terrorists.  Not only was Spain considered the weakest of the allies, 
the country had also been a major staging point for international terrorism due to its proximity to 
Africa and to the existence of radical Islamic networks which provided logistical support for 
other attacks.  They also argued that the government diversion from the far greater priority and 
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effort on combating the domestic threat of ETA instead of focusing on international terrorism 
made them a major target.
 190
   
 Part of the appeal to terrorists who desired a world in which Muslims are able to reclaim 
their lost medieval territories stemmed from the stories passed down of the Umayyad Kingdom 
in Iberia known as Al-Andalus.  This kingdom was known for its utopian idea of religious 
tolerance (convivencia) in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims worked together.
191
  This 
heritage of tolerance made Al-Andalus a powerful force in Europe and Northern Africa from the 
seventh to the end of the fifteenth century when La Reconquista resulted in the Muslims being 
driven out of the Iberian Peninsula by Christians.  This vision of Muslim Spain as “the ornament 
of the world,” a phrase written by a Saxon writer in the tenth century to describe the capital of 
Cordoba, was a standard held up by extremists as a potential vision of a resurgence of the 
Muslim renaissance in the late twentieth century and into the twenty-first.
192
  Al-Andalus was 
mentioned multiple times by the Al Qaeda leadership as a land that had to be recovered from the 
infidels who had taken it away.  Bin Laden threatened Spain specifically in several of his 
messages to his followers and to the outside world, especially in a videotape from October 7, 
2001, in which he directed his focus to an “Al-Andalus for Islamic persons” as an example of the 
“splendor of the caliphate to be recovered from the infidels.”193 
 With these varying motivations for the Islamic terrorists who conducted the attack on 
Madrid, it was easy to see the confusion amid the reports of those who wanted Spain to suffer for 
fighting in Iraq or those who wanted the return of Muslim rule.  Regardless of the personal 
motivations of the individual terrorists as to why they chose to attack innocent civilians in trains 
across Madrid, it appears that the overall group motivation for the attack was to punish the 
Spanish government for siding with the U.S. in the war in Iraq.  The bombings may also be seen 
as part of the overall strategy to attack Western targets.  This rationale fits into the evidence of 
meetings among the leadership of Al Qaeda, the documentation and propaganda police recovered 
during their investigations, and the analysis conducted by the terrorists into the strengths and 
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weaknesses of potential targets; which saw Spain as the best possible target logistically, 
ideologically, and historically.  The evidence pointed to the calls to retake Al-Andalus as more 
idealistic propaganda than an actual plan. 
 One area that deserves further study is whether or not North African Islamist groups were 
involved in the attacks.  There is evidence that several members of the terrorist group that 
conducted the 11-M attacks were members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), 
which is Al Qaeda affiliated.
194
 
Aftermath Connection to Duality of Spain 
 Incredibly, the controversy over which terrorists were responsible for the 11-M attacks 
continues to the present time.  The continuing controversy has spawned conspiracy theories and 
has divided Spain.  Lisa Abend, reporting five years after 11-M, references opinions about the PP 
having a difficult time accepting the election loss and the PP viewed the PSOE as having robbed 
them of the election because of the bombings.  She also mentioned that the PSOE believed they 
won because the PP government was not telling the Spanish people the truth about the attacks 
and the people realized that the government was lying.
195
  This split between the two parties 
widened over the next four years of the PSOE government.  In a postscript to his article, “Spain 
Changes Course,” Paddy Woodworth wrote on July 5, 2004, that Aznar had just ferociously 
attacked the Zapatero administration by saying that the change in government was “an 
unqualified success for the terrorists behind the March 11 bombings” and that the only PSOE 
policy “consists in the systematic and deliberate destruction of everything that has made Spain a 
strong and prosperous country.”196  The relationship between the new PSOE government and the 
PP Opposition began badly and the conspiracy theories were just beginning. 
 In the first four years of the first Zapatero administration, he greatly changed Spain 
socially.  After he met his promise regarding Spanish troops leaving Iraq, he achieved major 
legislative victories: 1) full marriage and adoption rights for homosexual couples, 2) fast-track 
divorces, 3) state control rather than Catholic Church control over religious education in schools, 
                                                 
194
 Carlos Echeverría Jesús, “The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 3 
(March 2009): 22-24. 
195
 Lisa Abend, “Five Years After the Madrid Bombings,” Time, March 11, 2009, accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1884231,00.html. 
196
 Woodworth, “Spain Changes Course,” 23. 
52 
 
and 4) the Law of Historical Memory to correct the wrongs against the victims of the Spanish 
Civil War and of the Franco dictatorship.  These changes along with the bad feelings from the 
March 14, 2004, election drove a war between the PSOE and both the PP and the Catholic 
Church.  For example, the Catholic Church issued guidelines for Catholic voters in the 2008 
election that “Not all manifestos are equally compatible with the Christian faith and its 
requirements.”  Obviously, the guidelines inferred that the PSOE policies were not Christian.  
All the controversy became very concerning in January 2006 when Lieutenant-General Jose 
Mena, the head of Spain’s army, warned the PSOE government that the army was losing 
patience with the government over the potential loss of Spanish territory following the granting 
of greater autonomy to the north-eastern section of Catalonia.  Comments were being heard 
about how some of the political right-wing rhetoric was similar to rhetoric which preceded the 
Civil War.
197
 
 Luis García Tojar conducted a study into the conspiracy theories published during the 
first four years of the Zapatero administration.  He said that the confrontation between the PP 
and the PSOE had produced a wide social breach in Spain because of the “theory of conspiracy,” 
which he defined as “a mixture of lies, false allegations and facts taken out of context aimed at 
suggesting that the terrorist attack in Madrid was not committed by Islamic fundamentalists but 
by ETA, and – which is worse – that the socialist government elected on 14 March 2004 for 
electoral purposes deliberately concealed the evidence that led to ETA terrorists, forcing the 
police investigation to focus on jihadist groups.”  Tojar also inferred that if this theory was valid, 
it meant that the PSOE must have had the support of the police, judges, and foreign intelligence 
services even before Zapatero formed a government, which was, of course, highly unlikely.
198
  
Tojar found that the 11-M conspiracy theory was promulgated by three main, important media: 
the El Mundo newspaper, the Catholic Church radio station COPE, and the public television 
channel Telemadrid.  He stated that El Mundo was apparently the leader in generating the 
conspiracy stories and that COPE and Telemadrid followed that lead.  He also stated that there 
was involvement with the PP.  He reviewed six major El Mundo published conspiracies and three 
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Telemadrid conspiracies broadcast as documentaries.  All were clearly fabricated.
199
  One of his 
conclusions was that the false conspiracies worked.  El Mundo and COPE improved the size of 
their audiences and sales and both placed second in their markets.  He indicated that in autumn 
2006, a poll found that twenty-three percent of Spaniards and fifty-three percent of PP voters 
believed that 11-M was not committed exclusively by jihadists.  Indeed, the PP had good results 
in the 2008 election.  Another of his conclusions was that the PP appeared to become a neo-
populism party.  He related how the conspiracy version of 11-M fits into populist movements: 
“according to it the terrorist attack should make the point of regeneración (regeneration, an old 
term in Spanish politics) of the people – its characteristic temperance, solidarity and bravery 
were always highlighted – against immigrants, terrorists (from ETA or Al Qaeda), corrupted 
politicians and members of the security forces.”200  The regeneración term hearkens back to the 
period between the Spanish-American War and the Civil War and was one of the intellectual 
movements seeking to renovate and revitalize Spain.  The regeneración movement had an 
objective and scientific approach to modernization.  The movement laid the ideological 
groundwork for Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and hence for Franco’s fascist dictatorship.201  
Tojar likely used the regeneración term as a way to subtly relate the xenophobia and nationalism 
of the conspiracy theories to fascism. 
 In summary, the controversies following 11-M and the 2004 election have widened 
fractures in a deeply divided Spain.  Tremlett may have said it best when he reiterated Aznar and 
Zapatero testimony to the 11-M parliamentary inquiry.  Tremlett stated: “Aznar, in the 
commission, gave wind to the conspiracy theories.  He talked about connections between ETA 
and Islamists.  The ‘intellectual authors,’ he added mysteriously, were ‘not in remote deserts or 
far-off mountains.’ Zapatero, in turn, claimed Aznar had orchestrated ‘a massive deceit.’  Both 
theories are now engraved in stone on each side’s version of events.”202  The identity theme of 
“two Spains” was valid again.  
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RECOVERY OF MEMORY AND BREAKING OF SILENCE 
“White Light” 
Hundreds of stars fall 
Over seas of silver, golden oases 
And cities of reddish clouds of rust 
 
Fall my two hundred fragmented bodies, 
My three hundred wishes, 
My thousands of words fall 
Over the children of our children, 
Multiplied by the reflection of the millions 
Of children of broken glass. 
 
Everything is white light, 
I do not hear the sirens 
Nor this abrasive odor do I smell. 
 
The red and violet stars fall 
Noting the instant at which I am one 
And this is you and I, and we were. 
A force surrounds us and gathers us, 
Proceeds from the silence of the city, 
From the beauty of the green mountains 
And from the meadows of enameled flowers; 
We rise transparent and magical. 
Everything is white light. 
Julia Barella, “Luz Blanca [White Light],” 2004203 
                                                 
203
 Julia Barella, “Luz Blanca” in Madrid, Once de Marzo: Poemas para el Recuerdo, ed. Eduardo Jordá and José 
Mateos (Valencia: Pre-Textos, 2004), 24.  Poem translated to English from Spanish by the author. 
55 
 
In the poem “White Light,” Julia Barella described the horrible events which transpired 
March 11 of 2004 or 11-M as known in Spain. This poem was part of an anthology of memory 
poetry created in the immediate aftermath of the train bombings.  The day after 11-M, the 
Madrid bookstore Rafael Alberti asked poets throughout Spain to write poems as testimony to 
the attacks, which could be placed in the windows of the bookstore to pay tribute to the victims.  
The response was substantial and a few days later, the bookstore commissioned the anthology to 
give voice to the silence of the dead.
204
  Compared to the silencing of memory following the 
Spanish Civil War, the outpouring of voices following 11-M was a loud, angry scream.  
Furthermore, Spain acted quickly to construct a memorial to the victims of 11-M.  An inspiring 
eleven-meter tall glass tower at the Atocha train station was opened on the third anniversary of 
11-M.
205
  In contrast to the lack of silence and quick recognition of 11-M victims, this section 
examines the protracted recovery of memory and the breaking of silence from the Spanish Civil 
War and how both were impacted by the aftermath of the 11-M attacks.  The section begins with 
a short overview of the Civil War. 
Civil War Overview 
 The 1920s saw the rise and fall of a dictatorship in Spain under the direction of Miguel 
Primo de Rivera, who was the leader of Spain from 1923-1930.  After his removal and the 
popular unrest of those who did not want to see the Bourbon King returned to power, democratic 
elections were held and, in 1931, the Spanish Second Republic was born.  This republic was, 
however, relatively short-lived as it was ended by the Spanish Civil War, which was another 
example of the Spanish political tragedy and was under assault from many directions by 
supporters and detractors.
206
  Following elections in 1936 in which the left won, the defeated 
rightists banded together with the military to force a coup of the government.  These rightists, 
who were led by the monarchy-favoring Carlists and the fascist Falange party, had combined 
forces with several Spanish military generals (later led by Francisco Franco) who broke their 
oaths to the Republic when they launched a coup from Spanish-held Moroccan territory in July 
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1936 that would see the right returned to power.
207
  This attack on the government signaled the 
climax of the political and societal class conflicts which had divided Spain following the creation 
of the Republic.  However, the short coup turned into a brutal three-year civil war which led to 
the deaths of over 800,000 people and more than 440,000 displaced persons.
208
 
 The Spanish Civil War saw unprecedented atrocities committed by both sides against the 
enemy and civilians which were largely ignored outside the Iberian Peninsula due to the greater 
atrocities which occurred during the Second World War.  Both the Nationalists and Republicans 
committed mass killings of prisoners and civilians during the fighting, including the killings of 
major cultural and political figures such as founder of the Falange, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera 
(son of the former dictator), and the poet Federico Garcia Lorca.  The repression the Nationalists 
committed against Republicans or sympathizers was such that leaders and public figures were 
executed in order to completely remove the old power structure and society, as well as the 
systems of freedom that they defended from the outset.  One Nationalist general was quoted as 
saying, in 1936, “Spain cannot be reconstructed until the entire political rabble is swept 
away.”209  This Nationalist violence continued throughout the war.  The Republican violence 
peaked in 1936 but declined sharply as the war went on.  A few of the main focuses of 
Republican violence were the clergy and Nationalist forces who were captured.  The Catholic 
Church did not attempt to reduce the violence, but instead blessed it and fully supported the 
Nationalist forces.
210
  In 1939, Madrid fell to the Nationalists and those who supported the 
Republicans either fled the country into exile or remained in Spain hoping for the day that 
democracy could return.  That day would not come for over three and a half decades. 
Amnesty and Silence 
The immediate years following the end of the war saw violence committed against 
suspected Republicans, though it paled in comparison to what the rest of Europe faced during the 
Second World War.  Most notably, a law was passed after the war ended which provided 
amnesty to those who committed a slew of crimes “against the Constitution” as long as they 
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could prove that they ideologically agreed with the Franco regime.
211
  Spain, though officially a 
neutral party, sent aid and troops to Nazi Germany and received food and oil from the U.K. and 
the U.S.  Domestically, the victorious Nationalists continued a campaign of terror over the 
defeated Republicans which resulted in at least 50,000 executions.
212
  Direct violence “lasted 
several years after the war in the form of executions that had a protolegal nature” and less violent 
ways of oppression, which had been underway during the war, continued into the postwar period.  
For example, people were tortured, displaced, imprisoned, or simply sacked from their jobs 
because they did not side with the Nationalists or subscribe to Francoist ideology.
213
  The 
cultural white-washing of the Republicans and their achievements had begun.  The majority of 
those killed had somehow benefitted, or were accused of having benefitted, under the system of 
the Republic.
214
   
The Nationalists were all heroes in Franco’s “revived” Spain which featured iconography 
and allusions to the great Spanish Empire of the past.  The victory of the Nationalists was 
endlessly commemorated with those who died had “fallen in the service of God and the 
Fatherland” with the defeated Republicans suppressed in the background.  Families of those who 
fell fighting for the Republican forces during the war were terrified to the point that most would 
not even lay claim to the bodies of their relatives or loved ones during the postwar period.
215
  
The period of purification of society coincided with the economic policy of autarky which the 
Franco regime followed, which effectively cut Spain off from the rest of Europe as a way to treat 
a “sick” Spain by placing it in “quarantine.”216  The purpose of this self-containment of Spain 
was to ensure that the crusade to liberate Spain from a “foreign, atheistic and un-Spanish yoke” 
could be completed without outside interference.
217
  Also during this period, anti-government 
forces formed and struck out with terrorist attacks and assassinations as a way to demand greater 
regional autonomy (as in the Basque region with ETA) or to attempt to overthrow the 
government.  However, the fate of both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany was not shared by Spain 
and Franco endured past V-E Day in 1945. 
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 The 1950s-1960s saw a renewed effort by Spain to attempt to regain international 
support, as the immediate postwar years saw relative isolation of Spain by the victorious 
democratic nations in the newly-formed U.N.  But as the United States became more concerned 
about expansion of Soviet communism, the Iberian Peninsula was recognized as being 
strategically important.  Following a U.N. resolution lifting the boycott of Spain, the U.S. 
resumed diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951.  Then in 1953, the Pact of Madrid was signed, 
which ended Spain’s neutrality and established a mutual defense pact with the U.S., the 
construction of U.S. military bases, and U.S. economic and military aid.  Subsequently in 1955, 
Spain was admitted to the U.N.  Although Spain became more open to the world as isolation 
ended, Franco maintained tight control over the country except for loosening control over the 
economy in the late 1950s.  The government narrative about the Civil War did not change. 
The nature of the commemoration of the Spanish Civil War also did not change during 
this period.  This was highlighted with the completion of the Valley of the Fallen monument in 
1959, which was built to commemorate the war and to honor the victimhood of Primo de Rivera 
in 1936 and of those others who fought for the Nationalists.  The monument was constructed 
over the course of eighteen years, of which the majority of the excavation and construction was 
completed by political prisoners, and remains the biggest war memorial in the world (as well as 
the one with the most religious iconography).
218
  The executions of political prisoners still 
occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s.  The last person executed for Civil War crimes was killed 
in 1963, over twenty years after the conclusion of the war and the prosecution of all crimes 
committed during the war was ended by a law passed by Franco in 1969.
219
  Thus, the Anti-
Marxist war (which Franco preached was the purpose of the Civil War) continued well past the 
cessation of hostilities.  This continuation was in order to silence the opposition’s memory of the 
events and then perpetuate the Nationalist victory.  Ultimately, Spain was able to recover from a 
disastrous postwar economy of autarky into a relatively-thriving economy in the 1960s to early 
1970s thanks to a booming tourist sector.  This booming tourist sector was hampered by 
increased emigration from the country as Spaniards sought work in other countries.
220
  The 
1970s saw a period of stagnation but also of hope as changes and transitions changed Spain. 
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 The period of transition actually started during the final years of Franco’s life as protests 
erupted across the country in the 1970s.  Much of the impact of these protests was lost in the 
later events of the transitional period of the mid-1970s; however, they were influential in those 
later changes.  The mass protests themselves were organized by ordinary citizens who risked 
torture and imprisonment to help create the conditions which would lead to the downfall of the 
dictatorship and the rise of democracy.
221
  These protests were helped by the changes which had 
opened up Spain in the 1950s and 1960s.  The accelerated modernization and the progress 
towards economic assimilation into Europe helped to undermine the Spaniards support for 
authoritarianism and autarky.
222
  The ironic aspect of these protests was that the changes that 
were introduced later on were consolidated by both the left and the right in order to avoid later 
problems that could end democracy.  Some of these problems included regional languages and 
customs, as well as alternative nationalisms, which had caused headaches for Franco and state 
policy makers for the regime during the dictatorship.
223
  Therefore, the dictatorship was “eased 
out of existence” and the past was not reconciled in order to attempt to sweep the period of the 
1930s-mid 1970s under the rug.
224
  This process for transition was also aided by the Spanish 
King, Juan Carlos.   
King Juan Carlos was the son of the former Spanish King, who was exiled in 1931, and 
was picked by Franco to return to the Spanish throne as he had not interfered with the dictator’s 
plans.  The monarch’s presence also fit into Franco’s plans as he saw the King as a person to take 
over after his own death to ensure the continuation and survival of the dictatorship.
225
  However, 
the protests and the pressure from multiple groups caused the advisers to the monarch to see that 
real changes had to occur to ensure the survival of the monarchy post-Franco.
226
  As such, the 
transitional period was not hampered by the monarchy and (ultimately) aided by it.  Even with 
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this help and support of the monarchy in the gradual shift away from authoritarian rule, regional 
differences still crept into the limelight and caused unrest in the last years of the Franco regime. 
The gradual opening of Spain and discussion of potential reforms briefly halted in 1973 
as hardline repression and censorship made a return.  This was due to the assassination of the 
Spanish Prime Minister (and potential successor to Franco) Admiral Carrero Blanco by ETA.
227
  
The harsher censorship made a small dent in the release of films which dealt with themes and 
circumstances which resembled Spain during the dictatorship, however the fact that these movies 
were allowed to be released in the first place demonstrated the loosening of control by the Franco 
regime in its final years and its diminished aversion to democracy.  This does not mean that 
supporters of the regime were in total agreement with the changes that occurred, as demonstrated 
by a younger Aznar who was a supporter of the Falange as early as sixteen-years-old.  Later 
articles he published during the late 1970s indicated his respect for dictatorship, aversion to 
democracy, and hostility to the term “nationalism.”  Ironically, he would later state his support 
for the 1978 Constitution as the standard for Spanish democracy.
228
  However, the regime was 
forced to change leaders when Franco died November 20, 1975. 
Following the death of the planned successor Blanco, Franco appointed Carlos Arias 
Navarro to be the leader in Spain and the one to takeover full responsibilities following the 
dictator’s death.  It was Navarro who had ordered the re-emerged repression following Blanco’s 
death in a time of turmoil and divisions in where the regime was heading.
229
  Once Franco died 
in late 1975, Navarro was in control of the government.  Navarro and his staff also were charged 
with making sure the regime could continue on without Franco.  There was concern among 
political elites that Franco’s death would spell the end of their legitimacy.230  Juan Carlos also 
had a place in government and, ultimately, a say in the direction of the future.  He broke with the 
past and the Franco regime when he betrayed the deceased dictator’s wishes and dismissed the 
Navarro government in July 1976 and appointed his own leader, a younger Francoist insider by 
the name of Adolfo Suárez, to lead the transition to democracy.  Suárez’s appointment led to the 
1976 Law of Political Reform which essentially voted the Franco regime out of office.  It also 
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led to the dissolution of the Francoist parliament and legalized political parties, along with other 
liberties enjoyed in democratic countries.
231
  However, these changes still differed from all other 
democratic countries and other transitional governments born out of authoritarianism.  They 
differed because many of the main institutions and people behind these changes had been part of 
the old guard of Francoism and had not been ousted or removed as in many other examples of 
revolutionary governments.
232
  As part of his commitment to building consensus, Suárez reached 
out to the Communist opposition and both sides agreed to negotiations to allow free elections.  
Other liberalizations occurred, such as universal suffrage and a bicameral system of 
representation, in the months that followed.  The first elections since the 1936 election (which 
led to the rebellion) were held on June 15, 1977.
233
 
The elections led to an unsurprising result: the center-right party founded by Suárez, the 
Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), won thirty-four percent of the popular vote and 118 
parliamentary seats.  Under the UCD, the bulk of the transition occurred.  On October 27, 1977, 
Prime Minister Suárez and leaders of the majority of political parties (minus those on the far-
right and far-left fringes) signed what became known as the Moncloa pacts which announced the 
commitment of the political parties to allow a collaborative process to policy making.
234
  This 
coincided with the deliberations of parliament on the articles that would go into the Constitution.  
These deliberations resulted in the negotiation of the first twenty-five articles by the UCD, which 
were opposed by the PSOE.  This opposition led to a change in the negotiations to a joint 
operation between the PSOE and the UCD.
 235
  The Constitution was later passed in 1978 and 
consequently the bulk of the transition from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy occurred 
under the new constitution. 
To allow the two major sides to cooperate, the government and the major political parties 
decided that the best way was to forget the past grievances.  This was accomplished in an 
unwritten pact of silence (pacto de silencio) and a law: the 1977 Amnesty Law.  This law 
essentially provided the legal basis that “allowed the country ‘to pretend that it had forgotten the 
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past’” and enabled the creation of a new political order that was built on mutual respect and 
tolerance.
236
  However, this did not help the families who had lost loved ones during the Civil 
War and had not been able to come to terms with that loss during the dictatorship.  The 
restitution for the crimes was indefinitely delayed and would not become a political issue until 
over two decades following the constitution.  If the silencing of post-Civil War memories were 
as a dam (the pact of silence) stopping the flow of water (Republican memories), the transition 
period only patched the small cracks that were appearing from the weakening of the authoritarian 
regime and the dam kept the outpouring of memories from occurring.  This should not understate 
the importance of the Law of Amnesty, as it provided the basis for later memory recovery once 
there was sufficient distancing from the dictatorship.  The law did include some of the most basic 
restitutions: such as purged army officers being reinstated, disabled veterans receiving pensions, 
and compensation for those jailed for more than three years.
237
  Not only was there an attempt at 
a basic reconciliation with Republicans who had suffered during the war and postwar period, 
there was also an attempt to reconcile with those were in exile and those regions who had been 
alienated during the years of the dictatorship.   
Preliminary steps were taken to recover Spanish heritage by the public recovery and 
reintegration of those Spaniards who had been exiled after the war and the decision for the 
creation of autonomous regions through the Constitution.
238
  This also included attempts to 
rectify past grievances to a small extent such as the bombing of Guernica during the Civil War.  
Events began to be organized to commemorate the bombings and their victims started as early as 
April 23
rd
, 1977, and represented the beginning of atonement for some of the crimes committed 
by the Franco regime and the Nationalists.
239
  Unfortunately, these steps were not fully 
implemented and have remained a sticking point in Spanish politics as silence and amnesia 
pervaded.  Part of this was due to the breakdown of cooperation between the two main sides of 
the left and the right due to mutual distrust (not just between the parties, but also between the 
parties and the people).
240
  Another part was due to the strained relations between the UCD and 
Suárez after the elections of 1979, as leaders within the party began to lower their support for 
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Suárez as they saw him as trying to build too much consensus.  However, Suárez’s motivation 
for compromise paved the way from dictatorship to democracy. 
The reason that it was important for both sides to cooperate was the mutual fear that any 
major disputes between the main parties could lead to a repeat of 1936.  This fear resulted in 
political elites compromising on “contentious issues rather than risk confrontation during the 
transition period.”241  Many of the meetings of the new government, even prior to the first 
elections, had violence to contend with as the breakdown of the authoritarian rule led to 
explosions of attacks by the left and the right.  1976 was a particularly violent year as ETA 
attacked governmental targets (including the murder of the head of a provincial council) and a 
right-wing revolutionary organization kidnapped the president of the council of state and the 
president of the superior council of military justice.
242
  Thus, the transition period consisted of 
both moderation and violent extremism which in turn affected the process of the overall 
transition.  The fear of a new Civil War almost became all too real when early in 1981, a group 
of officers within the military attempted a coup of the government. 
On February 23
rd
, 1981, a group of officers led by Civil Guard Lieutenant Colonel 
Antonio Tejero stormed parliament and held the members at gunpoint.
243
  This coup attempt 
sparked fears of the outbreak of another civil war and the reconciliation process was halted.  This 
included efforts to pay homage to Republican war dead and exhumation of graves, which would 
not be reconciled until at least two decades later.
244
  Ultimately, the coup failed when the rest of 
the military did not join in the attempt to overthrow the government.  This was due to the mass 
outpouring of support for democracy by Spaniards, who demonstrated in the streets during the 
day of the attempt, and the subsequent refusal of Juan Carlos (head of the military) to allow the 
continuation of the coup.
245
  The damage, though, had already been done.  The reconciliation that 
had been pushed during the late 1970s up until early 1981 was halted and a return to consensus 
was pushed by both sides.  Both the Socialists and the UCD temporarily restored consensus 
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following the coup, however that consensus was short-lived as the UCD began to have internal 
structural problems and later lost the elections of 1982.
246
 
In 1982, the infighting within the UCD cost them the election and the Socialists became 
the ruling party.  Thus, the first left-wing party was in power since before the Civil War.  
However, the silence which had resulted from the transition period persisted as none of the 
political leaders in Spain wanted to shake-up the status quo.  The Socialists focused their efforts 
on celebrating older events as a way to look at Spanish history from before the twentieth century.  
For example, two of the major events that were celebrated were the discovery of America (the 
quincentenary in 1992) and the death of the Enlightenment king, Charles III (the bicentenary in 
1988).
247
  These events were an attempt to get people to forget about the dictatorship and to 
celebrate the glorious past of Spain.  However, this was the same attempt the Franco regime tried 
and the Spanish people did not feel the same way about the need to completely silence the period 
of the dictatorship and Civil War.  Even as early as the 1970s, the Civil War was a popular topic 
of discussion within academia and through popular culture (notably films).
248
  However, most 
Spaniards still agreed that the avoidance of official reckoning of the past was the correct thing to 
do.
249
  Advisors within the government also agreed that it was the correct thing to do.  The leader 
of the PSOE, Felipe González, was even cautioned by a former general to leave the subject of the 
Civil War alone in order to “not provoke the ire of the army.”250  Nonetheless, the 1990s saw an 
increase in the academic discussion of the war, which grew to heated exchanges at the end of the 
Socialist period. 
Breaking of Silence 
As historians began to conduct more research into the Civil War and the Spanish Second 
Republic in the 1990s, opinions from the transition were called into question.  The research 
allowed the Republic past of Spain to lose its’ connection to dysfunctionality and Marxism and 
became more respectable and palatable versus the Franco regime conceptualization.
251
  This also 
reflected a shift in victimhood for each side.  The shift occurred as archival research pointed to a 
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greater amount of violence/deaths committed by Nationalists against Republicans than the other 
way around; which was the official narrative during the postwar period.
252
  The reshaping of the 
past in order to open the discussion of what had happened during the Civil War caused the later 
collective memory boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s as it changed the history, memory, 
and oblivion of the war and the dictatorship.
253
  The boom would occur under the rule of the 
main right-wing party in Spain, PP, which came about following corruption scandals within the 
ruling PSOE in the mid-1990s. 
Following their defeat in 1982, the UCD lost most of its relevancy.  In fact, they were not 
the main opposition to the PSOE during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s.  That job went to 
the further-right group, the CP (Coalición Popular).  The CP eventually was taken over by Aznar, 
who rebranded the CP as the PP in 1989.
254
  Aznar’s desire to lead Spain was helped by the 
corruption scandals that sullied the image of the PSOE as well as a continued illegal war the 
party fought against ETA in the late 1980s, but the PSOE remained in power until 1996.  Aznar’s 
own hatred of ETA stemmed from an attempt on his life in 1995 when a bomb almost killed 
him.
255
  His popularity continued to increase and in March of 1996, the PP won the election but 
was unable to gain an absolute majority.  As a result, Aznar cautioned his party to tread softly in 
the first term and make more rightist policies in subsequent terms.
256
  Regardless of policies, the 
victory for the PP spelled the first time that a right-wing party had won an election within Spain. 
During the first term of Aznar as Prime Minister, the right-wing policies that were 
enacted were small and gradual to avoid fears of a major shift to the right.  However, the theme 
of the “two Spains” was still alive and well during this period.  The PSOE opposition began to 
use the Civil War as an electoral weapon against the PP, which became most apparent in 1999 as 
the next election was nearing.
257
  Along with this, the PP created a committee in 1997 aimed at 
reforming history education in Spain.  The Plan for Improving the Humanities, as the initiative 
which created the committee was called, led to the development of a syllabus which “restored the 
balance between premodern and modern history” and focused on the “unitary character of the 
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historical trajectory of Spain.”258  This angered many regionalist groups in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country as they saw the syllabus as an attempt to eliminate the autonomous regions and 
their own histories.  Large numbers of essays and editorials were published in 1997 speaking for 
or against the educational reform.  This started the “history wars” which signified the beginning 
of major debates in politics, academia, and the general public over the Civil War and Franco 
dictatorship.  The education reform was dropped by the end of 1997 as only the PP supported it, 
but it would make an appearance again in the PP’s second term of 2000-2004.259  The need to 
reconcile the past came to a head in 1998 when Spain made international news. 
On October 16, 1998, General Augusto Pinochet of Chile was arrested in London on 
charges brought by Spain for the disappearances of thirty-five Spanish nationals in Chile during 
his dictatorship.  The charges were made by Judge Baltasar Garzón, who argued that the forced 
disappearances were an on-going crime not just against the victims but also against the people 
who had been obstructed by the government during their search for the disappeared.
260
  This was 
ironic as it showed that Spain was willing to prosecute crimes against humanity in other 
countries (involving her citizens) yet was unwilling to prosecute crimes committed at home.  
Therefore, this arrest led to more calls for the recovery of collective memory and served as a 
precursor for what would happen in the PP’s second term. 
In 2000, the PP was elected to a second term with a majority in Parliament.  With the 
majority, their policies became more and more conservative during this term as they sought to 
consolidate their power.  But in a surprising move, the PP did explicitly condemn the 1936 coup 
and the Francoist regime in a 2002 parliamentary bill.
261
  At the same time, they continued the 
fight against regionalism by focusing on collective national ceremonies and symbols.  The PP 
promoted flying the Spanish flag in public, the playing of the national anthem, and displaying the 
coat of arms.  This also included the proclamation of the need to support collective events and 
sports to “strengthen the cohesion of different social strata.”262  Though, the only way to 
strengthen this cohesion would be to forget about the Civil War and the Franco regime.  
However for all intents and purposes, this was not done during the period of PP rule as they 
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alluded to the use of the “glorious past” that was a return to the harping during the period of the 
dictatorship. 
263
  Education also began to focus more on traditionalist views in an echo of the 
Franco period. 
In 2003, a more radical set of reforms created by a new Minister of Education was passed 
through parliament (as the PP had the majority).  These reforms were “designed to shape the 
values of new generations of Spaniards along traditionalist lines.”264  These traditionalist values 
included the return of religion as a compulsory subject.  However, this went against the 1978 
Constitution.  In the Constitution, it explicitly stated that there was to be a separation of church 
and state.
265
  Thus, the PP was more interested in traditional values than compromise and 
following the Constitution.  At the same time as this was happening, collective memory became 
more and more of a popular discussion as steps were taken to recover lost Civil War memory and 
bodies. 
Starting in the late 1990s, the recovery of collective memory became more of an interest 
for the general public.  A grassroots campaign to create a public memory of the Civil War 
culminated in 2000 with the creation of the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory 
(ARMH).
266
  The work of this association has often been seen as the beginning of the breaking of 
the pact of silence and, at least in the general population of Spain, a willingness to address the 
issues brought about by the Civil War and the Franco dictatorship.  This also extended to the 
desire for restitution for the victims and their families, the honoring of the dead, and the 
acknowledgement of the extra-legal violence that plagued both the Republican forces and the 
Nationalist/Francoist forces during and after the war.
267
  The public view of restitution and 
recognition (as well as confronting) of the past was more prevalent in younger generations.  For 
example, a slight majority of Spaniards in the early 2000s were still afraid of a recurrence of 
political violence as a result of confronting the past.  However, by a significant margin, young 
Spaniards were least likely to hold this same fear as they had not been alive during the Civil War 
                                                 
263
 Núñez Seixas, “Conservative Spanish nationalism since the early 1990s,” 135. 
264
 Sebastian Balfour, “The Reinvention of Spanish conservatism: The Popular Party since 1989,” in The Politics of 
Contemporary Spain, ed. Sebastian Balfour (New York: Routledge, 2005), 158. 
265
 Balfour, “The Popular Party since 1989,” 158. 
266
 Vincent, “Memory and oblivion since the Spanish Civil War,” 64. 
267
 Ibid., 64-65. 
68 
 
or the dictatorship.
268
  The cracks in the dam of silence were getting wider.  The 2002 
condemnation of the 1936 coup signaled a change from a forward-looking plan based in 
consensus to establish democracy (as in the original pacts of the 1970s) to a backward-looking 
plan based in dissent to consolidate democracy and as a way to renegotiate what had happened 
during the transition.  The two plans resulted in two separate outcomes: political conciliation in 
the case of the 1970s and social reconciliation in the case of the 2000s.
269
  These plans were also 
thrown into disarray by dramatic events: the 1970s reconciliation by the 1981 coup attempt and 
the 2000s reconciliation by terrorist attacks. 
Given Aznar’s hatred of ETA, it was understandable to see why he would focus so much 
effort on antiterrorism.  The international scene for terrorism, which exploded after 9/11, allowed 
Aznar to intensify the antiterrorism campaign.  This also benefitted PP strategy to avoid any 
negotiations with the Basques, which would undermine the push toward an integrated 
nationalism in Spain.
270
  Even the banning of a political party, an event unknown in democratic 
countries, was not the subject of international condemnation when the PP banned the Basque 
party known as Batasuna in 2002.  This undisguised attack on regionalism and democracy in 
Spain led to more radicalization among those wanting more autonomy and further division 
between regional interests and the main government, something the PP claimed to be trying to 
work for.
271
  Negative PP emotions were extended to the ARMH.  The ARMH was seen as 
creating more division and shining light on the period the PP wanted to put to bed.
272
  The 
explosion of collective memory and the antiterrorism campaign would become interconnected 
following the 11-M bombing in 2004. 
11-M Aftermath 
Following the 11-M attack, responses by the Spanish public were quite distinct from 
those which had come from the transition period or the postwar period.  Those older periods saw 
the general public respond with fear.  The aftermath of 11-M saw the general population respond 
with anger, the polar opposite of what the past had seen.  Along with anger, the Spanish people 
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voted the PP out of office and an intensification of the breaking of silence (a process started in 
the 1990s) occurred.  The mobilization of people to demonstrate was also faster and more 
pronounced as technology had improved significantly since the 1970s.  The protestors were able 
to organize in greater numbers in more cities and were able to get their anger across through the 
polls three days after the attack.
273
  This anger plus the unpopularity of the policies which had 
been implemented by the PP (especially in their second term) led to the victory of the PSOE.  
The regions that saw the most dramatic change in support from PP to PSOE were the 
autonomous regions, such as the Basque Country and Catalonia, which had been negatively 
affected by PP policies.
274
  The change in government also signaled a change in major support 
and sphere of influence.  The Aznar government was focused on increasing Spain’s power and 
world standing by allying with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy.  The Zapatero 
government was focused more on strengthening the European Union and ties with the member 
nations as well as restoring the respect and confidence of European partners.
275
  As the Socialist 
government changed spheres of influence, they also changed the official discussion on collective 
memory with initiatives to restore the Second Republic memory as well as continued efforts to 
improve on the 1977 Amnesty Law. 
The memory boom intensified under the Socialist government as commissions were 
created and laws were passed to reconcile the two competing Civil War collective memories.  
However, this competing collective memory was not something that could be easily reconciled 
and was a factor that led to further ideological divides within Spain.
276
  One of the major 
controversies which resulted from the memory boom was that revolving around the Spanish 
Second Republic.  The PP had engaged in historical revisionism in the late 1990s and early 
2000s to show that the Franco dictatorship was “a necessary period of recuperation from the 
chaotic interlude of the republic and civil war” and depicted the Second Republic as a radical 
period in which a gradual progression of liberalism (starting in the late nineteenth century) to 
democracy was interrupted by the republic.
277
  In contrast, the PSOE worked to rehabilitate the 
Second Republic.  This was partly done by describing it as part of a historical continuation which 
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led to the stable democracy following the 1978 Constitution.
278
  The work to rehabilitate the past 
and to patch old wounds was exemplified in the 2007 Law of Historical Memory, which was a 
bipartisan supported law pushed by the PSOE to attempt to deal with the collective memory once 
and for all. 
On December 10, 2007, the Spanish parliament continued the opening of discussion on 
injustice and atrocities committed during the whole Civil War period by approval of the Senate 
for the passage of the Law of Historical Memory.  This law included the classification of 
sentences carried out by the Franco regime as “illegitimate” as well as instruction for national 
authorities to help in the location and exhumation of bodies from Nationalist and dictatorship 
mass graves.
279
  This greater effort to address the memories and silences of the past further 
intensified the breaking of silence.  To reuse the dam analogy, the cracks were widening to the 
point that small rivers of water were pouring out into the general collective Spanish memory.  
However, the dam of silence was not completely broken with this law and exterior events also 
led to erosion.  Silences are broken down through the passage of time, groups are able to come to 
terms with collective loss or disaster, and the needs of the group change.
280
  The Law of 
Historical Memory also extended the coverage of reparations which had been initially approved 
in the 1977 Law of Amnesty.  What rights had been given to military officers, soldiers of the 
Republican forces, and long-term prisoners (more than 3 years) under the 1977 law were 
broadened to include orphans, injured civilians, and those who served short-term incarcerations 
during the Civil War and the Franco regime.
281
  Even with these concessions, the refusal of the 
PP to allow the majority of the original plan for the Law of Historical Memory (including the 
refusal to nullify all sentences carried out by the Franco dictatorship) to be carried out showed 
the deepening ideological rift emerging in Spain.  The law also explicitly refused to define or 
impose a collective history on the Spanish people, but guaranteed the “right of each individual or 
group to remember the past in their own way.”282  Although these rights were guaranteed in the 
law, the rights of these groups to remember their own collective memory of the past did not 
extend to the public administration. 
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Another stipulation of the Law of Historical Memory required “the retirement of shields, 
insignias, plaques and other objects or commemorative forms of exaltation, personal or 
collective, of the military uprising, of the Civil War and of the repression of the Dictatorship” by 
all public administration.  As these symbols were objects of contention, the law sought to remove 
them to avoid future problems of offense and insult.
283
  However, this also was seen (especially 
by the PP) as an attack on the entire process of transition.  The language of the law also 
contradicted some of the major goals it set out to do: namely honor all victims of the war.  In the 
opposite of what the Franco regime did in postwar commemoration, the Law of Historical 
Memory only directly praised the efforts of Republican soldiers.
284
  The Spanish population 
agreed with the policies and politics of the PSOE enough that they were re-elected in the March 
2008 elections. 
The elections of 2008 proved that even the anger and vitriol which came from the PP in 
order to discredit Zapatero, the PSOE, and the 2004 election results could not overcome the shift 
which had occurred in the Spanish public opinion of the government in the 2000-2004 term of 
Aznar.  Although the Socialists did not win an overall majority, they increased their number of 
seats in congress (though so too did the PP) by five.
285
  The results proved the shift in Spanish 
politics into a two-party dominated system was, if unstable, complete.  As the PSOE had the 
initiative the PP had catching up to do before the next election period.
286
  The silence of the 
postwar period had been partially broken, but the dam was not completely broken in pieces and 
parts of it still held memories back.  The vestiges of the dictatorship still loomed large in 2008 as 
the memory and the war memorials of the Nationalist victors still dominated much of the 
commemoration in Spain.
287
 
The continued Civil War controversy post 11-M and post Law of Historical Memory was 
exemplified in the 2010 disbarment of Judge Garzón for opening an investigation into the alleged 
crimes against humanity committed by the Franco regime.  The difference in the reaction 
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between his prosecution of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1998 and the investigation of 
the Franco regime in 2010 was drastic as the Amnesty Law was violated by the investigation 
and, thus, the silence of the Franco dictatorship period remained.
288
  However, the breaking of 
the silence in the late 1990s to early 2000s of the Civil War period showed that the war itself was 
able to be reconciled.  The 2007 Law of Historical Memory cemented that.  The dictatorship, on 
the other hand, remains to the present-day as an unreconciled event that may not change until 
several generations of Spaniards have had enough time between the start of the transition period 
and the current democratic period.  The political disagreements have grown more heated and the 
rifts between the PSOE and the PP have widened, continuing the identity theme of the “two 
Spains.” 
Two Spains Reincarnation 
 The Civil War did not end in 1939.  Violence continued against members of the Republic 
in the form of executions and imprisonments.  As a means to secure his dictatorship, Franco 
divided Spain into winners and losers to keep alive the memory of the Civil War.  The 
Republican vanquished were labeled as ‘reds’ to create an ‘other’, who were persecuted.  The 
label was also indiscriminately applied to anyone deemed unworthy, thereby extending the 
atmosphere of fear throughout the society.  Neighbors did not trust each other.  Families were 
torn apart.  Franco’s alliance with the Catholic Church caused the ostracizing of large numbers of 
people.  The generation born of the ‘other’ during the Franco era also suffered the loss of civil 
rights.  Consequently, this ‘apartheid’ prevented a healing of the wounds of the Civil War and 
Spanish society was not able to move beyond the trauma.  “This necessarily produced a schism 
between public and private memory in post-civil war Spain.”289 
 For the thirty-six years of the Franco regime, Spaniards lived in fear.  Then after Franco 
died and the country transitioned to democracy, the political elites negotiating the transition were 
so fearful of another military rebellion that they instituted a total amnesty, which created a period 
of political silencing until the turn of the twenty-first century.  The trauma of the Civil War 
continued.  Two events during the early transition did lessen the “two Spains” divide.  These 
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were the return of the exiled ‘other’ and the ratification of the 1978 constitution.  However, 
tensions between the left and right continued and intensified when the PP won the 1996 election.  
Following the PSOE rediscovery of Civil War memory in 1999, the divide widened.  During 
Aznar’s second term, the divide widened more as Aznar implemented policies hearkening back 
to the Franco period. 
 Then the four days between the 11-M train bombings and the national election witnessed 
a major deepening of the divide between conservatives and liberals as millions of angry 
demonstrators took to the streets, questioning the integrity of the Aznar government.  Tensions 
rose more as Aznar questioned the outcome of the election and initiated conspiracy theories 
about 11-M.  Zapatero’s first term saw the “two Spains” battle reach tension levels nearly 
equivalent to that just before the Civil War as the victors in the Civil War began to sense they 
were losing the propaganda battle over the war they had won.  An opinion poll from 2006 in the 
middle of Zapatero’s first term found that 54.6% of Spaniards believed that there were still two 
confronted Spains.  Furthermore, the same poll found that 48.8% of Spaniards still talked about 
the Civil War.  Why nearly half of Spain continued to discuss the Civil War may be due to the 
grandchildren of the vanquished wanting answers regarding the unrecovered memory.
290
  
Considering the great modernization and economic improvement in Spanish life since the Civil 
War, it is surprising that the trauma lives on.  Most Spaniards lived in pueblos or villages at the 
time of the Civil War.  The split between left and right was at the village level.  The hatred was 
personal.
291
  There may be two explanations for the grandchildren’s demands.  One is that the 
last people who actually experienced the War are dying and the opportunity for their voices to be 
heard is rapidly passing.  Another may be that epigenetic changes in the parents of the 
grandchildren contributed to long-lasting fear and the continued telling of narratives.  As 
indicated by the memory battles, there is no consensus in Spain about the past.  Pierre Vilar’s 
1977 statement: “I now know that there are two ‘memories’ of any Spanish event” remains 
especially poignant.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This study explored and analyzed the impact of the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid terrorist 
attacks on Spanish Civil War memory recovery viewed through the lens of the “two Spains” 
identity theme.  The Civil War was initiated by a military (Nationalists) led coup d’état over a 
democratically elected leftist government (Republic) in 1936.  Both sides committed atrocities, 
but the victorious Nationalists under Franco conducted a cleansing process as they captured 
Republic territory.  After the end of the Civil War, Franco compounded the cleansing of 
Republicans by executing and imprisoning tens of thousands, especially during the Second 
World War.  Even as late as the dedication of El Valle de los Caídos in 1959, Franco was saying 
“The anti-Spain was defeated and beaten, but it is not dead.”293  Many people today label the 
Franco cleansing as a “genocide” for which there has been no justice.294  Only the Franco side 
obtained justice; the Republicans only experienced more injustice.  The Civil War and cleansing 
produced a bitter memory divide in Spain.  During the early transition to democracy after 
Franco’s death, an amnesty was granted to pardon all crimes committed by both sides in the 
Civil War and the Franco era.  A ‘pact of silence’ was observed by politicians until nearly the 
turn of the twenty-first century.  The transition emphasis on ‘collective madness’ of the Civil 
War and ‘never again’ was unsuccessful in overcoming the memory divide because it actually 
reinforced the Franco portrayal of the Civil War problem as ‘fear of chaos’ and the ‘need for 
public order.’295  Therefore, Spanish democracy was founded on injustice.  Additionally, without 
any accountability for the Franco era, the elites from both sides created a political system prone 
to corruption, particularly nepotism in government and business.  Despite the political 
accommodation of the transition, the unresolved memory divide persisted.
296
 
 One of the purposes of this study was to demonstrate that the Madrid terrorist attack and 
its aftermath intensified the recovery of memory and the breaking of silence in Spain.  Silences 
over the personal memories of the Civil War began to break as early as the late 1970s and 
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increased during the memory boom of the late 1990s and following the creation of the ARMH.  
Political silence began to be broken with the first uncovering of a Civil War victim grave in 
1999.  As silence was increasingly fractured in the early years of the new century, it was 
apparent that the Civil War persisted as the principal generator of historical tensions between left 
and right political factions.  This indicated that the long-standing differences were irreconcilable.  
At the time of 11-M, less than twenty percent of Spain’s population remembered the Civil War, 
yet half the people still discussed the Civil War.  11-M initially induced a massive outpouring of 
grief, but the immediate aftermath quickly demonstrated Spain’s ability to polarize as the 
memory debate became aggressively political.  Acrimony over an unexpected election loss led 
the PP to actively work to undermine the legitimacy of Zapatero’s win.  A group of politicians, 
journalists, and demagogues led by Aznar and El Mundo began to spread conspiracy theories 
about 11-M.  Thus 11-M reinvigorated the political warfare over Spain’s past.  The theme of 
“two Spains” had returned with a vengeance.  As Zapatero tackled previous taboo issues, the 
political warfare intensified.  Zapatero’s push for a law to aid the recovery of Civil War memory 
greatly expanded the tribal warfare back to the divisions over the Civil War.  The bitter and 
public political debate over 11-M and Civil War memory recovery fully fractured the silence of 
the transition. 
 In reality, both the PP and PSOE utilized the memory wars for their own purposes.  
Overall, Zapatero handled his acrimonious first term with good success as he expanded human 
rights and corrected past wrongs.  The Law of Historical Memory has had positive results, but it 
has not been enough.  Instead of bringing both the PP and PSOE together on issues, it has helped 
divide them even more.  It also failed to provide reconciliation for victims of the Franco 
dictatorship, allowing that conflicted memory to also divide Spaniards.  Regarding 11-M, the 
police investigation was quick and efficient and the judicial proceedings were thorough and 
effectively proved that ETA was not involved in 11-M.  The conspiracy theories about 11-M 
were groundless propaganda by those Partido Popular politicians, supporters, and conservative 
media who sought to undermine the legitimacy of the Zapatero government.
297
  The second 
purpose of this study was accomplished by demonstrating by data and analysis that the social 
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reaction to the immediate aftermath of 11-M was not fear but anger at both the terrorists and the 
government. 
 In many ways, Spain’s response to 11-M was different than how other countries 
responded to terrorist attacks.  At the time of 11-M Spain had a thirty-five year history of 
countering ETA terrorism.  Spain learned at least three principal factors in dealing with ETA 
terrorism, which were also applied to international terrorism following 11-M.  The foremost 
factor applied to ETA terrorism was to diminish popular support for the terrorists in both the 
Basque area and throughout Spain.  This factor has been more difficult for Spanish action against 
international terrorism, but it is critical for the international community.  A second factor was 
cooperation with other countries for intelligence gathering and for joint policing.  This 
cooperation was with France for combating ETA.  For international terrorism, Spain has mainly 
established cooperation with Morocco, the EU, and the United States.  Joint counter-terrorism 
activities with Morocco have been very effective in preventing attacks.  The third factor was 
aggressive policing, which has probably been the most useful factor Spain applied to 
international terrorism.  Spain developed a body of law and organized law enforcement to deal 
with ETA terrorism.  Spain utilized both national police and gendarmerie, the paramilitary 
Guardia Civil, to counter ETA.  An important component was the establishment of counter-
terrorism commandos.  Policing included comprehensive steps to counter terrorist financing, for 
covert action and infiltration, and for psychological operations.  Other important components 
were long jail sentences to avoid released prisoner return to terrorism and wide dispersal of 
terrorist prisoners to avoid jails becoming terrorism schools.
298
 
 Following 11-M, Spain implemented two significant changes to their counter-terrorism 
policies.  One was to reorganize and expand their security and intelligence agencies to deal with 
international terrorism.  As part of the expansion, Spain established a central agency for counter-
terrorism information coordination, the Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antiterrorista.  The 
second change was to reform and update terrorism laws, including reforms needed to meet U.N. 
resolutions and EU directives.  What is notable about Spain’s counter-terrorism measures are that 
they are based on law enforcement and not on military operations.  An important element in the 
legal framework is that Spain considers terrorism a national problem; hence, all terrorism cases 
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are heard and tried by the National High Court, the Audiencia Nacional.
299
  Spain also 
implemented more controversial laws that removed some constitutional guarantees for terrorist 
detainees.  These laws include incommunicado detention (solitary confinement) for up to thirteen 
days without legal representation and pretrial detention for up to four years.
300
  Recognizing the 
immigration integration problem and its association with radicalization, Spain in 2007 
established a multidimensional strategic plan to improve immigrant integration through 
education, employment, housing, social services, health services, etc.
301
 
 What has been the outcome of Spain’s counter-terrorism policies?  With tranquility and 
authority and without nationalistic paranoia or saber-rattling, Spain tried and convicted the 
terrorists responsible for 11-M within three and one half years of the attacks.
302
  By the tenth 
anniversary of 11-M, Spain had arrested at least 472 suspected Islamist militants and was 
maintaining a force of 1,800 police and security dedicated to counter-terrorism.
303
  Between 
2011 and 2014, Spain broke up more terrorist cells than any other European country.
304
  In 
France following the Hebdo attack of January 2015, Spain’s President of the Government, 
Mariano Rajoy emphasized “…that to combat terrorism, or at least that is the experience many of 
us in Spain have, we must adopt an attitude of fighting ceaselessly.”305  An Islamic Commission 
of Spain (CIE), which was set up in 1992 as a liaison between the government and the Muslim 
population, has been an important factor in reducing support for terrorism within Spain.  The 
Commission has provided a voice for the Muslim community and has negotiated with the 
government to obtain and assure civil rights.
306
  There was very little anti-Muslim violence 
following 11-M.  The reason why may be that Spain is one of the most religiously tolerant 
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countries in Europe, an outcome of the backlash from the Catholic Church repression during the 
Franco period.  An additional reason may be because anger immediately after 11-M turned from 
the terrorists to the government.
307
  Also, there has not been any anti-immigrant movement 
within Spain.  Restraint within Spain has been amazing and is a tribute to the democracy formed 
after Franco.
308
 
 In contrast, the United States’ response to terrorism has been different in many ways.  
Fifteen years after 9/11, the U.S. has not put on trial any of the responsible terrorists.  
Guantánamo remains open with suspected terrorists in limbo.  Terrorists have been placed in 
common detention in Guantánamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, thereby creating terrorism schools.  
Released prisoners have typically returned to terrorism.  The leader of the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) came out of one of the Iraq detention camps.  The U.S. engaged principally in 
military response with flawed outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.  Local and 
national police (F.B.I.) in the U.S. have been generally effective preventing large terrorist 
attacks.  Very large-scale electronic monitoring of communications has occurred.  Counter-
terrorism commandos have not been necessary within the U.S. because there has not been an 
organized international terrorism group within the country.  Some politicians have been taking 
advantage of increasing xenophobia to gain voter support. 
Although the election of 2004 following 11-M was a bracing validation of democracy, it 
is not remembered that way because the horror of 11-M did not heal, but instead exacerbated 
deep ideological divisions between left and right.  Ironically, ETA terrorism had actually united 
politicians and the people to reject the ETA.
309
  Since 2008 in Spain, the difficult economic 
situation with its associated high unemployment has been undermining social and political 
progress.  Zapatero won a second term in 2008, but the world-wide economic crisis hit Spain 
hard.  The Spanish economic miracle was over.  Earlier enormous over-construction had 
produced massive debt.  The government was forced into austerity measures by the European 
Union and had to take bailouts for banks. Unemployment skyrocketed and protests about 
economic inequality broke out across Spain.  By 2011, Zapatero’s popularity had plummeted and 
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the PP under Mariano Rajoy won the November 2011 national election.  However, political crisis 
and protests continued with a clash over economic, social, and political class divisions and 
economic injustice (inequality), which brought a resurgence of allusions to the Civil War and the 
“two Spains” theme.  In 2014, King Juan Carlos I abdicated in the midst of corruption within the 
monarchy and Catalonia independence was aggressively pushed.  The continuing economic crisis 
lessened support for both the PP and PSOE parties and two new national parties, leftwing anti-
austerity Podemos and pro-EU Ciudadanos gained substantial support.
310
  The national elections 
of December 2015 effectively ended the two-party political system as no party won a majority.  
Coalition government has become the new political reality.  It is likely that Spain is moving 
toward a more typical European Union political system with a diversity of ideologies.  Time will 
tell if the new several party system ends the “two Spains” identity theme or creates a new 
‘multiple Spains’ theme by developing more than two non-reconcilable positions. 
  
                                                 
310
 Sahagún, “Leaders of a Divided Spain.” 
80 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The process of Civil War memory recovery and healing traumatic memory is not 
finished.  Victim graves remain to be uncovered and their remains properly reburied.  Victim 
mourning cannot be completed until reburials are brought to a close.  Vincent stated that 
recovery of the past requires “a rewriting, a new narration of the past to reflect the agency of 
those in the present.”311  A common narrative of the Civil War and Franco era is particularly 
difficult to achieve when the memory war is presented as a moral struggle between irreconcilable 
social and political positions.  Furthermore, the scales of injustice are not balanced.  Can healing 
of the trauma be achieved without justice?  The time for justice in Spain is almost past with most 
of the guilty dead.  Why has Spain not had truth and reconciliation commissions, which are 
considered under international law to be the standard for handling transitional justice?  
According to Blakeley, the Spanish transition to democracy, with the Amnesty Law of 1977 and 
the Constitution of 1978, was founded on political conciliation, not social reconciliation.  
Continued fear from repression during the Franco regime and concern about the potential for a 
military coup drove political consensus.  There actually were attempts to recover historical 
memory, including recovery and reburial of victims, during the early years of the transition, but 
the military coup attempt of 1981 ended these attempts.  The political elite concluded that the 
Spanish democracy could not withstand confronting the past and consensus politics ruled for the 
remainder of the twentieth century.
312
 
 With the breaking of silence, the ARMH in August 2002 attempted to force Spain to meet 
its international obligations by taking the case of recovering the ‘disappeared’ to the U.N. High 
Commission for Human Rights.  The case did provide impetus for the Spanish Congress of 
Deputies to unanimously approve the November 2002 resolution which condemned the military 
coup of 1936.
313
  Although the PP had bowed to pressure, the party counter-reacted and included 
in the resolution that the issue of “two Spains” would be removed from politics, which was an 
attempt to bring closure to the issue of the Civil War and avoid the truth.  The PP was also using 
the resolution as a way to prolong consensus politics.
314
  Then in 2005 Amnesty International 
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requested Spain to deal with its ‘disappeared’ and in 2006 the Council of Europe condemned the 
Franco regime.  A local first truth commission was established in Valencia in February 2007 to 
investigate post-Civil War repression, but it expressly did not deal with the Civil War.
315
  The 
2007 Law of Historical Memory seemed to finally start Spain on the path to do something about 
the ‘disappeared,’ but the Law was not adequately funded and when the PP government of 
Mariano Rajoy came to power in 2011, the budget for the Law was eliminated.  The U.N. in 
2014 again recommended that Spain take action to recover the ‘disappeared’ and to establish a 
truth commission, but Rajoy did not take action.
316
  More than one hundred of the Associations 
involved in memory recovery in Spain set up a Platform for a Truth Commission in 2013 to call 
for Spain to fulfill the U.N. resolutions and to establish “a parliamentary truth commission to 
recognize the victims of Franco and establish the facts.”  The campaign also called for the repeal 
of the 1977 Amnesty Law that prevents judicial investigations of crimes of the Civil War and the 
Franco dictatorship.
317
  However, Spanish government action has not occurred.  Clearly, the PP 
remains intransigent, but the PSOE had opportunities to do more.  Why are Spanish politicians 
not taking action?  Blakeley answered this question as being a failure of Spanish democracy to 
consolidate after the transition. 
 A key difference between mature, consolidated democracies and transitional democracies 
is that the normal political situation for consolidated democracies is political conflict within 
legitimate political institutions; whereas for transitional democracies the norm is political 
consensus.  Spain has experienced unending consensus politics with both conservative and 
liberal politicians striving to resolve issues outside of politics.  This may be partly a legacy of 
Franco’s “I don’t get involved in politics” statement or from fear of political conflict or lack of 
political will.
318
  It is more likely that the long-term balance between the conservative and liberal 
political parties and their alternating governments helped drive the prolonged consensus politics.  
The political conflict arising in the aftermath of 11-M may have started the end of the transition 
and its consensus politics.  The long-term balance between the two political wings has also been 
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shattered by the current four-party situation.  Maybe the multi-party situation is the beginning of 
consolidated democracy, but it is nearly too late for truth commissions to achieve any justice.  
Since prosecutions following a truth commission are becoming less likely as time passes, are 
there options for reconciliation and memory recovery without justice? 
International law for transitional justice is based on morality.  Is there a moral position 
that satisfies memory recovery without justice?  López-Quiñones discussed that memory 
recovery in a democracy is a civil rights-based process in which the principles of integration 
(assimilation), inclusion of excluded elements, appeasement (making opposites compatible), and 
resolution (reconciliation between adversaries) are promoted.  Furthermore, he argued that “In 
this implicit characterization of democracy, common ground and compromise in the name of the 
greater good have the upper hand over antagonism and unmitigated opposition between different 
political preferences.”319  One of the generally accepted maxims from the Holocaust is that 
history is morally obligated to remember the crimes.  Additionally, the trauma theory discussion 
in this thesis mentioned that Holocaust survivors have a compelling need to tell their stories.  
López-Quiñones also pointed out that “identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence.”320  
Following the above principles and based on the ideas of remembrance, recording of names and 
stories, identity shaped by recognition, recovery of the missing, and rewriting a new narrative, it 
is feasible to postulate a possible solution to the moral question of securing memory recovery 
without justice. 
 In reference to the memory of the Spanish Civil War, López-Quiñones suggested that: 
“There ought to be an institutionally promoted approach to this crucial past because the past (a 
particular version of it) should work as a tool to sponsor a set of values.”321  Building on his 
suggestion and with an overall objective to obtain moral closure for the Civil War, it is 
recommended that Spain depoliticize the memory debate by establishing an independent, neutral 
institution to fully investigate all victims and atrocities of the Civil War and the Franco regime 
for the purposes of remembrance of victims and crimes, recording of names and stories, 
recognizing the victims, assuring recovery of the missing, and rewriting a truthful history of the 
crimes perpetuated on victims from both sides.  It is additionally recommended that the 
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institution avoid being involved in pursuit of justice and its associated political conflict.  The 
institution must produce an official accounting of all atrocities and victims and promote an open, 
unbiased discussion of the truth.  The issue of the Civil War can only be solved when both sides 
are awarded recognition.
322
  Jordi Gordon, spokesperson for the Platform for Truth Commission, 
emphasized “Spain has a blot on its entire democratic trajectory, which are the crimes committed 
under Francoism.  A democratic state in Spain can only be truly democratic if it recognizes what 
Francoism was.”323  To avoid a fracturing of the nation, it is also recommended that Spain 
initiate a second transition to find national commonality. 
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